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A Multilateralist Method
of Choice of Law
BY ScoTr FRUEHWALD*

INTRODUCTION

The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with
quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors
who theorize about mysterious matters m a strange and mcomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed
and entangled m it.'

W

illiam Prosser wrote these words in 1953. What would
Prosser think of the state of conflict of laws today9
This Article will explore the dismal swamp of conflict of laws. It will
present a theory on how conflict of laws got to be the way it is today It
will then propose a solution to the problems found in modem choice of
law
This author believes that many of the problems m modem conflicts
are due to a switch from a multilateralist approach to a unilateralist approach, beginning m the 1920s and 1930s. There are three major classes
of choice of law systems: (1) the unilateralist, (2) the multilateralist, and
(3) the substantive or better rule.2 Unilateralist systems focus on the
application of one jurisdiction's
laws; they begin with forum law, and
3
they tend to favor forum law

* Visiting Assistant Professor, Roger Williams Umversity School of Law.
Ph.D. 1984, City Umversity of New York; J.D. 1989, Umversity of Louisville;
LL.M. 1994, Umversity of Virginia. The author would like to thank Professor
John E. Noyes of California Western School of Law for ns comments on a draft
of this Article.
' William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication,51 MICH. L. REv 959, 971
(1952-53).
2 FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 45-

46 (1993). For a discussion of the better rule approach, see infra Part I.B (notes
63-66 and accompanying text).
' Dirk H. Bliesener, Fairness and Choice of Law: A Critique of the
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"Multilateralist approaches attempt to connect a factual situation with
the 'closest' appropnate legal system."4 A multilateralist method has two
main features: 1) "that choice of law may not reflect any unjustified
preferences," and 2) that "the result of a choice-of-law decision be
foreseeable by the parties to the controversy "5
This author believes that a multilateralist approach is the best option
for a group of states united under a federal government and constitution,
such as the United States.6 This author thinks that a choice of law system
should: (1) be grounded in positive law, (2) be substantively neutral, (3)
be forum neutral, (4) be predictable, (5) reflect the relevant states'
interests, and (6) be fair to the litigants. A multilatenst method of choice
of law can fulfill these requirements, 7 while a unilateralist one cannot.
In particular, a unilateralist approach is, by definition not forum neutral.
It is usually neither substantially fair nor predictable, and it generally
emphasizes the forum's interests, at the expense of the interests of the
litigants.'
This Article proposes a multilateralist method of choice of law, which
draws on existing approaches and that tis author believes satisfies the
above criteria. The method is compnsed of two steps: (1) identify the
legal relations created by the states whose laws might apply to the facts,
and (2) when two or more states create legal relations that apply to the
facts, choose the state's law that has the closest connection to the controversy 9

PoliticalRights-Based Approach to the Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L.
687, 704 (1994); see also LEA BR-LMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 17-19 (2d ed.
1995).
4 Bliesener, supranote 3, at 705; see also
BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 18.

5 Bliesener, supra note 3, at 707
6 Tis author believes that a choice of law method that works well in an
international setting may not be the best method for a group of states united
under a federal government and constitution. As David Cavers has noted:
Though our nation is divided into fifty-one separate legal systems, our
people act most the time as if they lived in a single one. In contrast,
when people or their legal transactions cross national border lines, I
suspect the legal significance of the action is much more likely to be
observed.
DAVID F CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PRocEss 119 (1965).

See infra Part IV.C (notes 152-55 and accompanying text).
matters are treated in detail in Part I (infra notes 107-41 and
accompanying text).
9 See infra Part IV (notes 142-55 and accompanying text).
'

8 These
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Part I of this Article examines the move from a multilateralist
approach to choice of law to a unilateralist one, beginning in the 1920s
and 1930s." Part II discusses the major choice of law methods that
courts use today, as well as additional approaches that have been
advocated by conflicts scholars." Part III presents this author's criteria
for choice of law 12 Part IV sets out this author's multilateralist method
of choice of law, 3 and Part V analyzes famous choice of law cases
using this author's system. 4 Finally, Part VI examines the need for a
uniform method of choice of law 15

I. THE MOVE FROM

A MULTILATERALIST TO
A UNILATERALIST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW

A.

ClassicalLegalThought andJoseph Beale s Vested Rights Approach

Joseph Beale's multilateralist, vested rights approach dominated
choice of law during the first third of the twentieth century, and it served
as the basis of the Restatement of Law of Conflict of Laws, promulgated
in 1934."6 Beale's vested rights approach arose during a period of legal
scholarship often called Classical Legal Thought. 7 Classical Legal
Thought emerged after the Civil War in an attempt to formulate an
autonomous legal culture that could deal with the enormous economic
and social changes that were occurring at that time. Classical Legal
Thought was a major jurisprudential school from approximately 1870
until the 1930s, and major proponents of tus school8 included Christopher
Columbus Langdell, Samuel Williston, and Beale.'

10See

infra notes
"See infra notes
12 See infra notes
13 See infra notes
"4 See infra notes
1 See infra notes
16 ROBERT

16-57 and accompanying text.
58-106 and accompanying text.
107-41 and accompanying text.
142-55 and accompanying text.
156-236 and accompanying text.
237-43 and accompanying text.

A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 1 (3d ed. 1977).

"7According to Morton Horwitz, Duncan Kennedy comedthe term Classical

Legal Thought. MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870-1960: THE CRsIs OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 273 n.1 (1992); see Duncan
Kennedy, Towards an HistoricalUnderstanding of Legal Consciousness: The
Case of ClassicalLegal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 REs. LAW & Soc.
3 (1980).
18 HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 5, 9-10; G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA. AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 6 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, TORT

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85

Classical Legal Thought scholars considered law a science. 9 Modem scholars have
labeled their mode of thlnking "conceptualistic" or
20
"formalistic."
Obsession with ineluctable rules, principles, and axioms became
characteristic of the academic disciplines of the time. By applying a
curious combination of spiritualism and Darwinism, economists, natural
scientists, and sociologists discovered universal absolutes that governed
their fields.
One had only to discover these truths: political,
economic, sociological, and biological theories flowed from the
discovery
Jurisprudence was likewise attracted to the universal principle.
Judges began their decisions by making verbal distinctions, defining
concepts in useful ways. They then pronounced their definitions as
axiomatic. From then on it was a rush downward to the result: the
axiom was applied to the facts of a case, and certain things "invariably"
followed.2'
Related to tins syllogistic thinking is the nineteenth-century preoccupation with categories.2 2 "For late nineteenth-century scientists, the
primary end of legal scholarship was the extraction and classification of
governing principles m an area of law "23 These thinkers used bright-line
distinctions, rather than "differences of degree."24 The key was to place
a dispute m the correct category; once the dispute was in the correct
category, the result became clear.25

LAW].

"' Thomas C. Grey,Langdell'sOrthodoxy, 45 U. PiTT. L. REV 1, 5 (1983).
20

GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 62 (1977); HORWITZ,

supra note 17, at 16-17; WHITE, TORT LAW, supra note 18, at 6. See generally

Grey, supra note 19. For a defense of the period's legal thought that tries to view
it in its original context, see Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as
Science: The Beginning ofAnti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L.
REv 1 (1980).
21

G. EDWARD

WHITE,

From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:

Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, in
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 99, 101-02 (1978) [hereinafter
WHITE, SociologicalJurisprudence].
22

HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 17-19.

23

WHITE, TORT LAW, supra note 18, at 33.

24

HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 17-18.

25

Id. at 18.

CHOICE OF LAW
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Also part of Classical Legal Thought was an objective approach to
Thinkers adopted objective theones to create umformity Thus,
courts determined negligence objectively, rather than by looking at the
tortfeasor's subjective intent. Similarly, courts examined questions of
contract formation not based on the parties' subjective intent, but on
objective factors.27
Thomas C. Grey has described Christopher Columbus Langdell's
approach to law- "Langdell believed that through scientific methods
lawyers could derive correct legal judgments from a few fundamental
principles and concepts, which it was the task of the scholar-scientist like
28
himself to discover.
Elizabeth Mensch has demonstrated how this process worked in
contracts:
law.26

Williston's monumental treatise on contracts assumed that from the
general principle of free contract one could derive the few central
doctrines around which the treatise was organized - offer and acceptance, consideration, excuse, etc. - and from the logic of those central
doctrines one could derive all of the specific rules that made up the law
of contracts. Those rules could then be applied, rigidly and formally, to
any particular social context; m fact, failure to do so would be evidence
of judicial irrationality and/or irresponsibility.29
Beale's vested rights approach to choice of law followed the tenets
of Classical Legal Thought; in particular, once one places a set of facts
in the correct substantive category, choice of law is clear. Beale based his
system on territory; a state has exclusive jurisdiction within its borders
and no authority outside its borders.3" Under Beale's system, the
location of a significant temtorial factor in the occurrence or transaction,
usually the last act, determines which state's law should govern.3 1 For
example, the law of the place of the mjury controls in torts cases, and the

Grey, supra note 19, at 11.
HORwrrz, supra note 17, at 35.
Grey, supra note 19, at 5.
29 Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE
PoLITcs OF LAW 16, 24-25 (David Kan'ys ed., 1982) (footnote omitted).
26
27
28

30 JOSEPH

H.

BEALE, SELECTIONS FROM

A TREATISE

ON THE CONFLICT OF

LAWS 6 (1935).
31RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
[hereinafter FmST RESTATEMENT].

§ 377 (1934)
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law of the place of the making of a contract applies in contract cases.32
In addition, under the vested rights approach, rights and obligations
"vest" at the applicable time and place in accordance with the state's law,
and other jurisdictions must recognize the rights or obligations.33 In
other words, a court does not enforce another state's law, it enforces
vested rights arising under the other state's law
In theory, vested rights provides a simple and uniform approach to
choice of law A court merely determines the character of the issue, and
applies the appropriate rule to the facts. The result should be the same
regardless of the forum in which the case is filed.
The vested rights approach, however, contains mechanisms that allow
judges to avoid "awkward" results. One of these mechaisms is characterization. For example, a court can characterize a problem as a contracts
34
case instead of a torts case, allowing a different state's rule to apply
Also, a court does not have to enforce a vested right when enforcement
of that right violates the forum's public policy3 5
B. The Realist Attack on Beale's Approach
Realist scholars in the 1920s and 1930s attacked the tenets of
Classical Legal Thought and Beale's vested rights approach to choice of
law, which exemplified Classical Legal Thought. "The point of the
Realist critique was to emphasize that the architecture of Classical Legal
Thought was neither neutral, natural, nor necessary, but was instead a
historically contingent and socially created system of thought."3' 6
Realist scholars viewed syllogistic reasoning as mechanical, formalistic, and conceptualistic.37 They believed that judges should not derive
32

Id. §§ 311, 323, 325, 332, 377, 386.

3'BEALE, supra note 30, at 1, see also A.V DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW
OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT OF LAws at xliii (1896); Slater
v Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (describing the vested rights
approach as the "obligatio" theory).
14 See Levy v. Darnels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164-65
(Conn. 1928). For a discussion of this case, see infra Part V.I (notes 232-36 and
accompanying text).
35 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 612 (1934). For
additional examples of choice of law manipulation, see infra Part LI.B (notes
121-29 and accompanying text).
36 HORWITZ, supra note 17, at 6.
37 Id. at 198-206. This attack began in the first decade of the Twentieth
Century. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, MechanicalJursprudence,8 COLuM. L. REv
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legal rules from general pnnciples; they adopted Holmes' aphorism that
"[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases.""J Rather, these
thinkers drew on experience, reality, and social policy-making.3 9
These scholars also rejected bnght-line categories, in favor of
balancing tests and distinctions of degree.40 For example, a rule of
reason test replaced an absolute view of restraints of trade in antitrust
law 4 1 Similarly, courts often used balancing tests when evaluating
negligence in torts.42
An article by Walter Wheeler Cook, one of the major proponents of
a new approach to choice of law, exemplifies Realist legal reasoning.
Cook declared that "[ilt may seem incredible, but it is still possible for
eminent members of the bar to assert that all a court does in deciding
,3
doubtful cases is to deduce conclusions from fixed premises
Cook thought that, rather than applying pure logic to a case, judges
legislate; they make law' Because a judge makes law, Cook thought
that a judge should base his analysis on social or economic policy
Consequently, "the judge will need to know two things: (1) what social
consequences or results are to be aimed at, and (2) how a decision one
way or another will affect the attainment of those results." 45
Realist scholars, such as Cook, Ernest Lorenzen, and David Cavers,
attacked Beale's choice of law approach for not reflecting the law in
practice.46 They rejected both territorial sovereignty and vested rights.47
First, Lorenzen contended that courts choose law based on policy, not
605 (1908).
38 Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 HoRwrrz, supra note 17, at 202, 208-10; WHrrE, SociologicalJunsprudence, supra note 21, at 122, 124-25; see also Roscoe Pound, The Theory of
JudicialDecision, 36 HARV L. REV 641, 645-46, 954-56 (1923).
40 HoRwrrz, supra note 17, at 199.
41Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
42 United States v Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
43 Walter W Cook, Scientific Method of the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303, 307
(1927).
44 Id. at 308.
45 Id.
46 E.g.,
David F Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARv L. REv 173, 173-75 (1933); Walter W Cook, The Logical and Legal
Bases of the Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 458-60, 464 (1924); Ernest G.
Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict ofLaws, 33 YALE L.J.
736, 743-46 (1924).
17 BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 35.
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territory 4 Second, because Realist scholars believed that "'law' is a
prophecy of what courts will do," they rejected the concept of vested
rights as nonsensical.49 Cook declared that "[w]e must
constantly
resist the tendency to which we are all subject to reify, 'thngify' or
hypostatize 'rights' and other 'legal relations."' 50 In addition, Lorenzen
attacked the consistency of a theory that creates a right that must be
recogized by other states, then allows a state to refuse to enforce that
right based on policy "
From the above criticisms of Beale's system, Cook made the move
from Beale's multilateralist approach to conflicts to a unilateralist one. In
one of the key passages in conflicts' history, Cook wrote:
[T]he forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign elements,
always applies its own law to the case, but m doing so adopts and
enforces as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly
similar though not identical, in scope with a rule of decision found in
the system of law in force in another state or country with which some
or all of the foreign elements are connected, the rule so selected being
in normal cases, and subject to the exceptions to be noted later, the rule
of decision which the given foreign state or country would apply, not
to this very group of facts now before the court of the forum, but to a
similar but purely domestic group offacts involving for the foreign
court no foreign element.52
In other words, "a court never enforces foreign rights but only rights
created by its own law
,53 The focus is now on the forum's relation
to choice of law (unilateralist), not the relationship of the facts to the
appropriate legal system (multilateralist).
Cavers similarly attacked Beale's multilateralist approach. He rejected
any "jurisdiction-selecting" rule - a rule that chooses law without

4'Lorenzen,

49

supra note 46, at 743, 745, 748-50.

Cavers, supra note 46, at 175-76; see also BRiLMAYER, supra note 3, at

37-41.
50 Cook, supra note 46, at 476. Cavers wrote similarly, "one may now
wonder how any juristic construct such as 'right' could have been accepted as
fundamental in the explanation of any important aspect of judicial activity."
Cavers, supra note 46, at 175-76.
5 Lorenzen, supra note 46, at 746-47
52 Cook, supra note 46, at 469.
53 Id. at 475.
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considering the law's content.54 "Without taking the content of the
conflicting laws into account, how could one know what would satisfy
the demands of justice or the requirements of policy9"5 5
The Realists made valid criticisms of Beale's approach to choice of
law. First, Beale's insistence that only one state's law can apply to a
controversy was mechanical and arbitrary A state's laws can extend
outside its territory Consequently, a case can have connections to several
jurisdictions, and as will be shown below, more than one jurisdiction can
create a legal relation that might apply to a situation. Second, Beale's
idea of vested rights reflected an out-moded jurisprudence - that judges
merely found the law, rather than making it.56
While these criticisms of Beale may be valid, they did not require the
rejection of a multilateralist approach to conflicts in favor of a unilateralist one.57 This author believes that this rejection of a multilateralist
approach to choice of law created the dismal swamp of which Dean
Prosser complained.
II.

MODERN APPROACHES TO CHOICE OF LAW

Courts today use four main methods of choice of law- (1) Beale's
First Restatement approach, (2) Currie's governmental interest analysis
approach, (3) Leflar's best rule approach, and (4) the Second Restatement

approach." In addition, several scholars have advocated other solutions

5 CAVERS,

supra note 6, at 9; see also Cavers, supra note 46, at 194.

5CAVER.S, supra note 6, at 9.

56

In addition, Beale's mechanical approach can also cause rights to vest

when the state has not created a nght that governs a case. See infra note 177
17 As Brilmayer points out, vested nghts are not the only type of nghts.
"We should not reject a rights-based approach to choice of law without first
trying to discover what the best possible nghts-based theory might have to
offer." BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 223; see also John Bernard Con', Interest
Analysis and Choice ofLaw: The Dubious Dominance ofDomicile, 1983 UTAH
L. REV 651, 673-76.
5 A list of conflicts methods that states use is contained in Henna Hill Kay,
Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv 521,
591-92 (1983). As of 1983, approximately one-third of the states employed the
First Restatement approach. Id. at 582; see also Gregory E. Smith, Choice of
Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1172-74 (1987). Modem
courts, however, use Beale's method without its conceptual framework,
concentrating instead on its territonal rules.
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to conflicts of law This Part will examine modem systems of choice of
law that have not been discussed above.
A.

Currie's Governmental InterestAnalysis Approach

The work of the Realist scholars was mainly critical rather than
constructive. It was not until Brainerd Curre's governmental interest
analysis method of choice of law in the late 1950s and early 1960s that
a scholar developed a system that seriously challenged Beale's approach. 9 Following Cook and other Realist scholars, Cume developed
a unilateralist system that looked at choice of law from the forum's
viewpoint and examined the policies behind the laws that the forum
might apply
One may summarize Currie's method as follows:
1. Even in cases involving multistate elements, a court should
generally adopt forum law
2. In cases where a party argues that another state's law should apply,
the court should first examine the governmental policy behind forum law
Next, the court should determine whether the forum has a relation to the
case that furnishes a legitimate basis for it to assert an interest in the
application of its policy
3. Next, the court should determine the policy behind the foreign law
and whether the other state has an interest in applying its policy
4. When the forum has no interest in applying its policy, but the
other state does, the court should adopt the other state's law
5. When the forum has an interest in employing its law, the court
should adopt forum law, even though the other state has an interest in
applying its law 6 o
As can be seen from this summary, although Cume examines the
policy behind the various states' laws, he advocates that a forum should
generally apply its law. A forum should adopt foreign law only when it
has no interest in employing its law Curie expressly rejects the weighing
of each state's interests in conflicts.61

'9 See BRAINERD CuRRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963).
60 Id. at 183-84. Later in hIs career, Cume suggested that sometimes a court
should give forum law "a more moderate and restrained interpretation" in
deference to the foreign state's interest. Id. at 757-58. Courts generally have not
followed this modification.
61 Id. at 181-83, 601-02.
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Currie's approach gave choice of law two key terms - false conflicts
and true conflicts. Under Currie's method, a false conflict (or false
problem) exists when only one state has an interest m applying its law 62
In such a case, a court should adopt the state's law that has an interest in
using its law When two or more states have an interest in applying their
law, a true conflict exists.
B. Leflar'sBetter Rule Approach
Professor Robert Leflar believed that judges used choice of law
mechanisms, such as characterization, to hide the fact that they were
seeking the just result.63 Leflar felt that judges should not hide this
preference, but rather should emphasize it.
Leflar's approach consists of five choice of law influencing considerations:
(A) Predictability of results;
(B) Maintenance of interstate and international order;
(C) Simplification of the judicial task;
interests;
(D) Advancement of the forum's governmental
64
law.
of
rule
better
the
of
(E) Application
While Leflar emphasizes that courts should consider all five factors, his
analyses and those of courts following his system seem to rely on the
better rule of law factor more than the others. 65 Not surprisingly, those
states employing Leflar's system usually find their law to be the better
rule.66
E.g., id. at 107, 163, 180, 189, 726. Professor Robert Leflar points out
that "false conflict" has two meanings in choice of law. In addition to Cume's
usage, a false conflict describes the situation where the laws of the possible states
are the same or would produce the same result. LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 18789.
63 LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 180-81.
Id. at 195. Professor Juenger also advocates a substantive approach.
JUENGER, supra note 2.
65 E.g., Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Heath v. Zellmer, 151
N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1967); Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 252
A.2d 176 (R.I. 1969).
66 William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticismin Choice ofLaw: Hybnd Method or
Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REv 645, 691 n.216 (1983); BRILMAYER, supranote
62
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C. The Second Restatement Approach
The Second Restatement67 reflects the influence of several choice
6
of law approaches, and it is both multilateralist and unilateralist. 1
Section 6 sets out choice of law principles:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relevant interests of those states in determination of the
particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of results, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.69
Professor Reese, reporter of the SecondRestatement, has written that "the
values stated in section 6 underlie the entire field of choice of law and
that all of the black letter rules stem from these values." 70

3, at 71.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws (1971) [hereinafter
SECOND RESTATEMENT].
67

The Second Restatement originally "was to contain rules, not policies,
in its black letter formulations
" Kay, supra note 58, at 553. However,
while it was being drafted, the Second Restatement received considerable
criticism, particularly concerning its failure to consider Curne's scholarship. Id.
at 553-55. "The Restatement Second was thus promulgated with two vastly
different conceptions about how a choice of law problem should be addressed."
Id. at 555.
68

69

SECOND

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 67,

§ 6.

Willis L.M. Reese, The SecondRestatementof Conflict ofLaw Revisited,
34 MERCER L. REv 501, 516 (1983) (footnote omitted).
70
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Section 145 sets out the "most significant relationship test" for
torts 71 which resembles step two of this author's choice of law method:

72

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of
§ 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluatedaccording to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.73
in

The Second Restatement adopts similar tests for contracts, 74 property,7"
agency, 76 etc.

The Second Restatement also has specific rules for particular
situations. For example:
71 Scholars also sometimes call this test "the center of gravity" test. This test
will be discussed in detail infra Part V (notes 156-236 and accompanying text),
in connection with a discussion of Auten v. Auten. Savigny developed a related
theory in the Nineteenth Century, which he called the "seat of the relationship."
FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAViGNY, PRiVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

27, 94-95

(1869).
72 However, this author believes that reading section 145 in conjunction with
section 6 is difficult because the sections involve different choice of law
concepts. As Professor Kay has declared, "[i]n the drafters' attempt to mollify
their critics, they have created an umbrella for traditionalist and modem theorist
alike: a fragile shelter that may prove itself unable to survive any but the most
gentle of showers." Kay, supra note 58, at 562. Or as Professor Brilmayer has
stated, "[t]he overall picture reminds one of the famous humorous definition of

a camel: namely, a horse drafted by committee." BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at
75.
73 SECOND RESTATEMENT,
74

Id. § 188.

7- Id. § 222.
76

_d. § 291.

supra note 67, § 145.
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In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties,
unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the
occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other
state will be applied.77
As others have noted, this section sounds suspiciously like a reversion to
a lex loci delicti approach that Beale adopted in the FirstRestatement.7"
D. Lea Brilmayer's Negative Rights Approach
In recent years, several scholars have harshly criticized Curre's
method of choice of law " Instead of Currie's policy-based system,
several of these scholars choose law based on rights. This Article will
examine three of these approaches in the next three subparts.
Lea Brilmayer advocates an approach based on negative rights against
the government.8" Her proposal is not a definitive method for choosing
law; rather, it is an approach to determiing what law a court can choose,
much like due process limitations on choice of law Accordingly,
Brilmayer's proposal may allow the law of several jurisdictions to be
77Id.

§ 146.

See David E. Seidelson, Interest Analysis or the Restatement Second of
Conflicts: Which is the Preferable Approach to Resolving Choice-of-Law
Problems?, 27 DUQUESNE L. REv 73, 84-85, 117 (1988); Joseph William
Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REv 731, 736 (1990).
However, note that one is supposed to read section 146 in conjunction with
section 6.
7' E.g., Lea Brilmayer, InterestAnalysis and the Myth ofLegislativeIntent,
78 MICH. L. REv 392 (1980); Lea Brilmayer, Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REv 555 (1984); Friedrich K
Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critiqueof InterestAnalysis, 32 AM. J. COMP L.
1 (1984); Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83
COLUM. L. REv 772 (1983). See also the articles cited nfra Parts ll.D-F (notes
79-106 and accompanying text). For a reply to some of these critics, see Robert
A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preferencein the Conflict of Laws: A
Response to the 'New Critics,'34MERCER L. REv 593 (1983). See also Herma
Hill Kay, A Defense of Cume's Governmental InterestAnalysis, 215 RECUEIL
DES CouRs 9 (1989); Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law - Interest Analysis: They
Still Don't Get It, 40 WAYNE L. REv 1121 (1994).
78

80 BRILMAYER,

supra note 3, at 219-63.
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applied to a situation. "A negative rights-based argument might nile out
of State A law without dictating a choice between B and
the application
1
' 8

c's.

Brilmayer rejects choice of law systems predicated on furthering
social policy because "one cannot simply take for granted the fairness of
using a multistate litigant as a means to an end."8 Instead, Brilmayer
sets out "[a] political rights model of choice of law [that] requires a state
to justify its exercise of coercive authority over an individual aggrieved
by the application of the state's law " 3 In other words, "a state must be
able to justify the burdens that it imposes, as well as explain the benefits
it seeks to achieve, when it applies its law "84
The first step in Brilmayer's approach "is to identify the circumstances under which the state has, or lacks, an adequate justification for
coercion."85 First, the court must determine the connection between the
state and the party burdened by the application of that state's law An
adequate connection between the state and the burdened party might
comprise: (1) the party is a local domiciliary, (2) the party has consented
to the application of the state's law, or (3) the party has voluntarily
affiliated herself with the state by engaging in local conduct or activities
with foreseeable legal consequences in the state.86 Second, the court
must analyze the connection between the state and the party who is to be
benefitted by choice of law "Is there the sort of connection that would
allow application of local law if the tables were turned and he or she thus
stood to lose?"87 Ideally, a court will adopt the law of a state with
connections to both parties.
Brilmayer's negative rights approach is comparable to the early
writings of the Realists that criticized vested rights. The Realists attacked
the intellectual foundations of vested rights without putting forth a system
under which choice of law could be finally determined. Similarly,
Brilmayer makes legitimate criticisms of Cume's method without
developing a defimte basis for determimng choice of law, although her
approach, like the Realists' writings, may contain the foundation of such
a system. However, the most important aspect of Brilmayer's proposal is
at 223.
Id. at 235-36.
83 Id. at 240.
84 Id. at 262.
85 Id. at 240.
16 Id. at 241-53, 262.
87 Id. at 262; see also id. at 253-59.
81 Id.
82
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her argument that a litigant has a right not to have the law of a state
applied to a lawsuit unless the litigant has a connection to the state
sufficient to justify the imposition.
Brilmayer's approach is unilateralist in that it focuses on the
application of one state's law Dirk H. Bliesener points out that Brilmayer's approach merely reverses Currle's method."8 Curne looks at the
relationship between the state and the individual; Brilmayer examines the
relationship between the individual and the state. Bliesener criticizes both
approaches because they favor one side over the other.8 9 Interest
analysis favors insiders; Brilmayer's proposal favors outsiders.
E. Dane's Vestedness Approach
Like Brilmayer's approach, Perry Dane's approach to choice of law
is not a full-fledged system, but a constraint on choice of law 90 In his
article, Dane attacks choice of law systems based on lexfori, those that
favor forum law Instead, Dane advocates a multilateralist approach,
which he calls "vestedness," that requires that "the court of any forum
should, in selecting the criteria governing the substantive elements in an
adjudication, apply choice of law criteria that could be expected to
generate the same set of substantive criteria if they were applied by any
other forum in an actual adjudication."9
Dane points out that vestedness does not guarantee identical
results.92 First, it does not require that all jurisdictions adopt the
same choice of law rule. Rather, it mandates that the conflicts rule a
jurisdiction employs produce the same substantive criteria if used by a
different forum. Second, vestedness might not produce the same substantive result even if jurisdictions adopt the same choice of law rule.
Nonsubstantive elements may generate different outcomes. Moreover, two
judges in different forums might view an identical controversy differently,
which, of course, is also true of two judges sitting in the same jurisdiction.
Bliesener, supra note 3, at 705.
Id. at 706.
90 Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, "and Choice of Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1191, 1209 (1987).
9'Id. at 1205.
92 Id. at 1207-09,
88
89
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Kramer'sInterpretiveMethod

Larry Kramer advocates an interpretive method of choice of law9 3
He points out that choice of law problems are not limited to multistate
situations, but occur in domestic lawsuits. He suggests that one can apply
techniques for solving domestic choice of law problems to multistate
situations.
Kramer proposes a two-step method of choice of law- (1) one must
determine whether there is a conflict of laws, and (2) if there is a
conflict, one must employ a "second-order rule of interpretation to choose
between these laws."94 Obviously, a court does not have to choose
between laws unless two laws can govern a case. Kramer calls establishmg whether more than one law might be applicable "determining a law's
prima facie applicability ""
Kramer adopts a rights-based approach m determining a law's prima
facie applicability He looks to see whether a law creates a right that
might apply to the case. In other words, has the legislature, expressly or
implicitly, intended that the law govern the situation? Such analysis "has
two components: (1) ascertaining the purpose that led to the adoption of
a law in wholly domestic cases, and (2) presuming that the law applies
only when that purpose is advanced in the state."96
The above analysis may generate three results: (1) no law creates a
right, (2) one law creates a right, and (3) both laws create a right. In
many situations, this analysis will end the inquiry; if there is no right or
only one law furishes a right, there is no choice of law problem. If two
laws provide a right, then courts must go to the next step - resolving true
conflicts.
Kramer resolves true conflicts by using second-order principles canons of construction.97 These canons include: (1) "[i]f there is a
conflict between two states' laws, and failure to apply one of the laws
would render it practically ineffective, that law should be applied[,]"
3Larry Kramer, Rethinlang Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv 277
(1990).
94
Id. at 291.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 299.
97 Id. at 323-38. Kramer's canons resemble David Cavers "prnciples of
preference." See CAVERS, supra note 6.
9' Kramer, supra note 93, at 323. This canon resembles Professor Baxter's
comparative impairment approach. Comparative impairment means "to
subordinate m the particular case, the external objective of the state whose
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(2) "[i]n a conflict between a substantive policy and a procedural policy,
the law reflecting the substantive policy should prevail unless the forum's
procedural interest is so strong that the forum should dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens[,]"99 (3) "[iun contract cases, true conflicts
should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the parties, or, if no
express choice is made, by applying whichever law validates the
contract[,' 0 ° (4) "[w]here one of two conflicting laws is obsolete
the other law should be applied[,]"' ' and (5) "[w]here two laws
conflict, but the parties actually and reasonably relied on one of them,
that law should be applied." ' 2
Finally, Kramer discusses the role of reciprocity in the choice of
law 103 Kramer compares conflicts to the classic prisoner's dilemma in
game theory Both states would be better off if they cooperated in the
choice of law By cooperating, a state's law governs when it is especially
important to that state's interest, but the state would step aside when it is
important to the other state's interest that its laws apply That way both
states' policies would be furthered. Obviously, a state would be better off
if the other state cooperated, but it did not. In other words, there is an
incentive to cheat. However, this incentive to cheat is lessened by the fact
that the game is reiterated. If state A cheats on the first play, state B will
feel free to cheat on the second play Kramer does not believe that
cooperation will always result, but that both parties will be better off if
they do so.10 4
This author believes that Kramer's approach is a significant advance
in choosing law Courts should first determine whether a state has created
a right that applies to the controversy This author's method modifies
Kramer's first step by combining it with Hohfeldian analysis.'0 5
On the other hand, tus author disagrees with Kramer's use of canons
of construction to resolve true conflicts. Choice of law is not interpretive
on this level. Rather, once a court has identified the states' legal relations,
it should choose the law of the state with the closest connection to the
internal objective will be least impaired in general scope and impact in cases like
the one at hand." Id. at 318; William F Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REv 1, 18 (1963).
99 Kramer, supra note 93, at 324.
100 Id. at 329.
101 Id. at 334.
102 1d. at 336.
103 Id. at 339-44.
14 Id. at 341 n.224.
'o'
See infra Part IV.A (notes 142-45 and accompanying text).
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controversy In addition, Kramer's approach will not solve all choice of
law problems,"0 6 and his second step will be difficult for courts to use.
EI.

CRITERIA FOR A CHOICE OF LAW

This author believes that choice of law should satisfy the following
criteria:
(A) choice of law should be grounded in positive law;
(B) choice of law should be substantively neutral;
(C) choice of law should be forum neutral;
(D) choice of law should be predictable;
(E) choice of law should reflect the relevant states' interests; and
(F) choice of law should be fair to the individual litigants.
A.

Choice of Law Should Be Groundedin Positive Law

Many legal thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries conceived of law as a priori - law existed before government,
and the judge's role was to "find" this preexisting law 107 Many early
twentieth century legal scholars and judges rejected this natural law view,
arguing instead that the only law that existed was positive law - law
created by the state. Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience,"'0 8 and he fought against the
"brooding omnipresence in the sky,"' 9 Justice Brandeis rejected the
notion that there was a federal common law because there was no preexisting law for a judge to find."0
Wesley Hohfeld agreed that all law was positive law, and he
revolutionized legal thinking by categorizing property into four pairs of
correlative relations: right/duty, privilege/no right, power/liability, and
minmuity/disability "' Legal scholars have used these correlative
Kramer states that his canons are not intended to be exhaustive. Kramer,
supra note 93, at 322.
107 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERIcAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 107, 148-49
106

(1988).

,08 OLIVER W HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
"oSouthern Pac. Co. v Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
110
Erie R.R. v Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
...
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied

in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917-1918); Wesley Newcomb
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
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relations in a variety of contexts, and they are useful in thinking about
choice of law

12

While a few legal thinkers still view law as being based on natural
law,1 3 most modem scholars adopt a positive law approach. Tis
author believes that choice of law must be grounded in positive law choice of law analysis must begin by looking at the legal relations created
by the relevant states. " 4
Most modem choice of law approaches allow a state to apply its law
to a set of facts, even if that state has not created a legal relation that
concerns the case. This is because the due process requirement for choice
of law is minimal: A state can apply its law to a case, if that state has a
significant enough connection or aggregation of connections to the
case. " 5 Consider the facts of Allstate v. Hague, a leading case on this
rule. P's husband was a Wisconsin resident who had several automobile
insurance policies that he purchased in Wisconsin. He was killed in a
traffic accident in Wisconsin. His wife brought suit in Minnesota against
the insurance carner, claiming that the insurance policies should be
stacked (each of the policies paid off to the policy limit rather than
recovery being limited to the maximum under one policy). Minnesota
allowed stacking, Wisconsin did not. The Minnesota court, using Leflar's
better rule 11approach,
adopted Minnesota law and allowed the policies to
6
stacked.
be
The Umted States Supreme Court upheld the application of Minnesota
law on due process grounds because there was a significant set of
connections to Minnesota. The widow had moved to Minnesota after her
husband's death and mamed a Minnesota resident, and her first husband
had worked in Minnesota." 7

This author questions how the Court found a positive law basis for
applying Minnesota law "' First, the fact that a person worked m the
Reasoning,23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913-1914).
112 See infra Part IV (notes 142-55 and accompanying text).
,,3
E.g., JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
114 See infra Part IV.A (notes 142-45 and accompanying text).
...
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1980).
116 Id. at 305-07
117 Id. at 320.
"' Several other scholars have criticized this case. Bliesener, supra note 3,
at 687-90; Terry S. Kogan, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Choice of Law: The
Priority of Fairness over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. RaV 651 (1987); Linda
Siberman, Can the State ofMinnesotaBind the Nation? FederalChoice ofLaw
ConstraintsAfter Allstate Insurance Co. v Hague, 10 HOFsTRA L. REv 103, 104
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forum does not create a right for a non-resident to stack insurance
policies relating to an accident that occurs outside the forum. Similarly, how does the fact that a widow moved to the forum after her husband's death create a right? As Professor Twerski has written, "[t]he mere
fact that some other state can find some interest - real or imagined - in
the case cannot be enough to alter its local nature and prevent the
application of the law of the sovereign in which the transaction took
place.'1 19
Some existing choice of law systems are grounded m positive law
while others are not. Although partly based on natural law, Beale's
system is grounded in positive law. An important aspect of Beale's
system is that state law creates rights that vest. Similarly, Kramer's
approach is grounded in positive law His first step is to determine which
states have created rights that might govern a case. The Second Restatement, while not stating that choice of law should be grounded m positive
law, will usually produce such a result with its most significant relationship test because the state with the most significant relationship to the
controversy probably provides a legal relation that governs the case. On
the other hand, Leflar's better rule approach could produce a choice of
law that is not grounded m positive law As was seen mAllstate, the state
with the better rule might not create a legal relation that applies to the
controversy Finally, while not rejecting a positive law basis of law,
interest analysis concentrates on the states' policies
Currie's governmental
120
and interests.
(1981); Willis L. M. Reese, The Hague Case: An OpportunityLost, 10 HOFSTRA
L. REv 195, 200 (1981); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman,
Constitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10
HOFsTRA L. REv 35, 43 (1981).
19 Aaron D. Twerski, On Territorialityand Sovereignty: System Shock and
ConstitutionalChoice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REv 149, 169-70 (1981).
Cume's approach also allows a court to adopt a right created by a state's
...
law (e.g., a right to recover for wrongful death) because a state has an interest
m having that right govern, while rejecting the application of the limitations that
go with that right (e.g., damages limitations) because the state has no interest in
applying the limitations to the facts. As will be shown below in detail, see infra
Part IV.A (notes 142-45 and accompanying text), this author believes that this
analysis ignores the positive law basis of choice of law - a court should not
ignore the fact that states create legal relations in conjunction with each other.
A right often comes with limitations (e.g., an immunity or damages limitation),
and a court should not allow a remedy that would not exist under any state's law
absent a multistate setting.
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Choice of Law Should Be Substantively Neutral

This author, along with other writers who advocate a multilateralist
approach,' believes that choice of law should be substantively neutral:
choice of law should not differ based on how the judge feels the case
should come out. Choice of law is a method for determining what law
applies; it should not be a mechanism for corrective justice. The states
have varying views on what the law should be, and courts should not
ignore another state's opinion by abusing choice of law As P John
Kozyns has written, "[d]oes it really make sense to mix substantive
justice with conflicts justice? Under what authority, from what source and
in what practical way may a judge decide that one of two potentially
applicable systems of justice is more just?" '
Most choice of law approaches are not substantively neutral, and it
is difficult for a unilateralist system to be substantively neutral. On the
surface, Beale's multilateralist method seems to be substantively neutral.
For example, judges must apply the substantive law of the place of the
injury in torts cases. However, as stated above, ajudge can avoid a result
she disfavors by characterization. She can characterize a rule she dislikes
as procedural, rather than substantive, allowing her to apply forum law,
or she can characterize a situation as being governed by contract, rather
than tort, permitting a different rule to govern.
For example, a traffic accident occurs m Washington, where there is
a one-year torts statute of limitations.'
The plaintiff files suit m
Montana, which has a two-year statute of limitations, thirteen months
after the accident. Under Beale's approach, Washington law governs
because it is the place of the injury Washington law creates a right to
recover for the injury, but the action is barred if the statute of limitations
is considered substantive. A judge who believes that the plaintiff should
be compensated can overcome the bar of the Washington statute of
limitations by characterizing it as procedural, allowing her to adopt the
longer Montana statute.
Similarly, characterization of the category of a substantive right can
be outcome determinative. P rents a car in Arizona and is injured in a
traffic accident in New Mexico due to improper preparation of the car.

E.g., Bliesener, supra note 3, at 707-09.
p Jon Kozyns, Reflections on Allstate - The Lessening ofDue Process
on Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv 889, 906 (1981).
113 Unless citing a specific case or statute, the examples in tins Article are
hypotheticals and do not necessarily reflect actual state law.
12

122
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The rental contract contains a limitations of damages clause that precludes
recovery for pam and suffering. New Mexico enforces such clauses;
Arizona does not. If the court characterizes the action as tort, the
limitation of damages clause will limit the damages that P can recover
because the law of the place of the injury governs m tort actions.
However, if the court characterizes the action as contract, it can apply
Arizona law to invalidate the limitations clause and give P full recovery
Governmental interest analysis is not substantively neutral. 24
Rather, it is consequentialist and instrumentalist -judges under Curre's
system use choice of law as an instrument of social change. Thus, judges
evaluate alternative rules of law "according to the desirability of their
consequences."' 25 One can make numerous criticisms of the consequentialist element of governmental interest analysis.'26 However, the most
fundamental criticism is a Kantian one: governmental interest analysis "is
indifferent to what the parties
deserve
the individual is treated merely
127
as a means to an end."
Leflar's better rule approach is not substantively neutral. It intentionally allows a court to adopt whatever rule it feels is better, as long as the
state's law which is to govern meets due process requirements - the state
has a sufficient enough connection to the controversy that its law can be
used. As was shown in Part III.A, 8 this "sufficient connection" may
be tenuous. As was stated above, this author rejects the use of choice of
law to make substantive determinations. State legislators, 29 not judges,
should make the decision on what is the better rule. In addition, one
judge's notion of what the better rule is will often differ from that of
another judge. Finally, how does a judge make tus decision? Obviously,
the judge must base her decision on a general notion of justice - in other
Several commentators have pointed out that modem choice of law
systems, in particular governmental interest analysis, are pro-plaintiff. E.g.,
Singer, supranote 78, at 738; Michael E. Solimme, An Economic andEmpincal
Analysis ofChoice ofLaw, 24 GA. L. REv 49, 56, 81-89 (1989). If ajurisdiction
wants to be pro-plaintiff, it should do so at the substantive level, not through
choice of law. Why should a plaintiff have an increased right of recovery solely
because multistate elements are involved?
124

125
126
127

BRILMAYER, supra note 3,
Id. at 224-32.
Id. at 232.

at 225.

See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
Or the state's highest court in establishing common law rules. If the
state's highest court thinks a different rule should apply, then it should change
the substantive rule, not mampulate choice of law.
121
129
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words, natural law Should natural law be the basis of choice of law
when it is generally rejected m other areas of the law9
C. Choice of Law Should Be Forum Neutral
A major criticism by modem choice of law scholars of governmental
interest analysis is that it is not forum neutral.13 ° In Cume's governmental interest analysis, a forum should apply its law to true conflicts
because a forum has the right to prefer its interest to that of other states.
Tus author is not convinced that a state should further its policies by
choice of law at the expense of justice to individual litigants in a private
dispute. In particular, a jurisdiction should not be able to further its
interests in a way that is unfair to non-residents.
This author believes that choice of law should be forum neutral
because it prevents forum shopping for favorable law and that this ability
to forum shop is unfair, especially in light of the fact that the plaintiff
chooses the forum. Choice of law should be the same regardless of where
a case is filed;13 1 a case's outcome should not depend on choice of
forum.
Rosenthal v. Warren3 1 vividly illustrates the unfairness in "conflicts
localism" - "cases favoring local substantive law when the forum state's
relation to the controversy is clearly less than that of the place providing
conflicting law ,133In Rosenthal, a wrongful death case, the plaintiff's
husband, a New York domiciliary, had gone to a Massachusetts hospital
for an operation. The husband died while under the doctor's care, and the
plaintiff sued the doctor and hospital for malpractice. The question was
whether to apply Massachusetts law that limited wrongful death damages
or New York law that permitted unlimited recovery All conections to
the case, except for the husband's and wife's domiciles, were with
E.g., Dane, supra note 90, at 1205-06; Luther L. McDougal HI,
Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus Reformulated Governmental Interest
Analysis: An Appraisal in the Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning
Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 UCLA L. REv 439, 449-51
(1979); see also John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protectingits Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV 173 (1981).
131 As Gene Shreve notes, "[m]ultilateralism strives for uniform results m
choice of law." Gene R. Shreve, Choice ofLaw and the ForgivingConstitution,
71 IND. L.J. 271, 282 (1996).
132 Rosenthal v Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 856
(1973).
133 Shreve, supra note 131, at 271.
130
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Massachusetts.' 34 In particular, as the dissent pointed out, "the decedent
made a deliberate choice to undergo the operation m Massachusetts at
defendant hospital."'' 5 Nevertheless, the New York federal court
applied New York law, allowing unlimited recovery 3' 6
Most choice of law systems are not forum neutral, and a unilateralist
approach, by definition, cannot be forum neutral.3 7 As was true of
content neutrality, Beale's system seems forum neutral, but characterization can make the place the suit is filed outcome determinative. As was
stated above, governmental interest analysis consciously favors the forum.
Similarly, the Second Restatement and Leflar's approach list the forum's
interest as a factor courts should consider when choosing law On the
other hand, Dane's approach explicitly advocates forum neutrality
D.

Choice of Law Should Be Predictable

A major goal of any legal system should be predictability Individuals
need to know how the law governs their behavior so that they can
conform their behavior accordingly Similarly, businesses need to be able
to predict what the law will be so that they can conduct their affairs with
certainty Consequently, any choice of law system should be predictable.
If choice of law is not content neutral, it is difficult to predict what
rule controls a situation. Consider a hypothetical under Leflar's better rule
approach. D is a railroad company that operates solely in Texas. Texas
has a rule that passengers on railways can contractually waive their right
to recover from railroad companies for negligence. Tickets issued by D
have such a waiver that is valid under Texas law P, an Oklahoma
resident, is injured through D's negligence while a passenger on D's
railroad. Oklahoma allows recovery for damages when its residents are
Rosenthal, 475 F.2d at 439-40.
13Id. at 447 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
136 Several scholars have strongly criticized tis decision. E.g., James A.
Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on ChoiceofLaw, 61 CORNELL L. REv 185,
225-27 (1976); Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Junsdiction,78 COLUM. L. REv
1587, 1605-06 (1978).
...
Professor Shreve points out that uniformity is not central to unilateralists,
including Curne. Shreve, supra note 131, at 284-85. Rather, these scholars
believe that unilateralist approaches, such as interest analysis, can produce a
better result. However, this author believes that a multilateralist approach can
produce both uniformity and a good result. As noted above, the problem with
Beale's method was that he mechanically choose law based on a single factor in
a controversy. A multilateralist system does not have to be mechanical.
14
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injured by another's negligence, regardless of where the accident occurs.
In addition, Oklahoma would not enforce the waiver of liability clause.
Under Leflar's better rule approach, the Texas court might believe
that the Oklahoma rule is the better rule and apply it because the Texas
rule is antiquated and Texas law generally favors compensating negligence victims. Thus, the railroad cannot plan its affairs with certainty
While many people will believe that compensation of negligence victims
is a major goal of law, the law should achieve this goal by changing the
substantive law, not by manipulating choice of law If the Texas
legislature believes that waiver of liability clauses should not be enforced,
it can pass such a law
Lack of forum neutrality destroys predictability If a forum can apply
its law to a situation regardless of the fact that another state's law might
be more appropriate, forum selection is outcome determinative. In such
a situation, it can be difficult for individuals and businesses to conduct
their affairs with certainty
Beale's method is the most predictable of the major choice of law
systems. It will usually be easy to establish the place of the wrong.
However, characterization and public policy irject unpredictability into
Beale's approach. Because governmental interest analysis is forum
favoring, a case's outcome often depends on where the case is filed, and,
thus, it is unpredictable. Similarly, the better rule method is unpredictable
because the outcome depends on what the judge believes is the better
rule. Finally, Brilmayer's approach limits the number of states' laws that
a court can apply to a case, but it often leaves the ultimate choice of law
open.
E.

Choice ofLaw Should Reflect the Relevant States' Interests

If a legal system is based on positive law, then choice of law should
reflect the interests of the states that created those laws. Courts should not
choose law in a vacuum. Rather, any application of law, particularly
choice of law, should reflect the policies and interests a state had when
it passed the law
Of the major choice of law systems, governmental interest analysis
pays the most attention to the states' interests in applying their laws. In
fact, governmental interest analysis is predicated largely on a state's
policy behind a law and a state's interest in applying its law Yet,
governmental interest analysis often rejects the law of the state that has
the most interest in employing its law (the state that has the closest
connection to the controversy) in favor of adopting forum law Under the
classic formulation of governmental interest analysis, the forum can
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employ its law with true conflicts as long as it has an interest m doing so,
regardless of the strength of another state's interest in having its law
govern. There is no weighing under Cume's system.
Tius author believes that not only should a choice of law system
reflect the states' interests, it should select the law of the state that has
the most interest in having its law applied. This author thinks that this
can be accomplished by choosing the law of the state that has the closest
connection to the controversy 138
F

Choice of Law Should Be Fairto the Litigants

This author believes that the primary goal of choice of law should be
fairness to the litigants. As Lon Fuller has stated:
Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can
have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is
kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had
acted, or was unintelligible, or was contradicted by another rule of the
same system, or commanded the impossible, or changed every minute.

139

While a lawsuit may affect society in general, and courts cannot ignore
the impact its decision will have on future cases, a lawsuit's main
purpose is individual justice. Yet most choice of law systems place little
emphasis on fairness to the litigants.
A choice of law system that is not substantively neutral is not fair to
the litigants. A rule might control a case that would not be applied absent
a multistate setting. Similarly, a system that is not forum neutral is unfair
because the place of filing suit can affect a case's outcome. Likewise, a
system that is not predictable is not fair because individuals will not be
able to conform their behavior and affairs to the law.
Although Beale's approach is the most content neutral, forum neutral,
and predictable of the major choice of law systems, it is not always fair
to the litigants because it sometimes allows a court to use a state's law
that has only a secondary connection to a case. Consider another waiver
of liability clause case. D is a railroad incorporated and operating mainly
in Missouri, with one tram a week taking passengers to Kansas City,
Kansas. P, a Missouri resident, buys a ticket on D's train to travel from

138 See infra Part IV.B (notes 146-51 and accompanying
,39 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALrrY OF LAW 39 (1964).

text).
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St. Louis, Missouri to Kansas City, Kansas. Tickets issued by D contain
a waiver of liability clause in favor of the railroad. Missouri refuses to
enforce such clauses, but Kansas does enforce them. D's mechamc
negligently repairs the train's brakes in St. Louis. Other of D's employees
fail to properly inspect the train's brakes m Kansas City, Missouri. The
brakes fail while the tram is in Missouri, causing it to go out of control.
Shortly after the tram has passed into Kansas, it jumps the tracks, and P
is injured.
Because P is injured in Kansas, the law of the place of the injury
controls, and P will not be able to recover for his injuries. Is this fair? P
and D are both Missouri residents, the negligence occurred in Missouri,
and most of the tram trip was in Missouri.
Governmental interest analysis ignores fairness to the litigants, in
favor of the states' interests. 4 ' In particular, it is not forum neutral.
Similarly, Leflar's better rule method is not fair because it allows ajudge
to adopt the rule that she thinks is preferable, regardless of whether
another state's law has a closer connection to the case. Finally, Brilmayer's rights-based approach considers fairness to the litigants, but her
approach does not insure a fair result because it only provides a loose
constraint on choice of law.
One can restate the above using a Rawlsian approach to fairness.
Professor Rawls wrote:
A practice is just if it is in accordancewith the principles which all who
participate in it might reasonably be expected to propose or acknowledge before one another when they are similarly circumstanced and
required to make a firm commitment in advance without knowledge of
1 41
what will be their peculiar conditions.
Looking at choice of law ex ante, which system is fairer: (1) an approach,
such as Beale's, that uses a single, perhaps fortuitous factor; (2) a
method, such as Curie's, that depends on the forum in which a case is
filed; (3) a system, such as Leflar's, that allows a judge to choose the law
that he or she thinks is the "better rule"; or (4) a method, such as this
Brilmayerpoints out that state interests and fairness are not mcompatible.
"States have policies about fair treatment; if nothing else they would want to
have their own people treated fairly in their own courts and in other courts."
BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 22 n.4.
141 John Rawls, Justiceas Fairness,in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL POLICY
80, 98
(Frederick A. Olatson ed., 1961).
140
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author's, that selects the law of the state with the closest connection to
the controversy 9
IV

A MULTILATERALIST METHOD OF CHOICE OF LAW

As mentioned above, state law creates rights, duties, privileges, areas
with no rights, powers, liabilities, immunities, and disabilities. More than
one of these relations may apply to a situation. For example, an
automobile accident takes place in Virginia. Virginia provides a right to
recover damages in persons who are injured by another's negligence. P
is injured by D's negligence. Thus, P has a right or a potential right to
recover damages against D.
However, P's right to recover damages against D is not the only legal
relation Virginia establishes m connection with the accident. Virgima
furushes an inmuity for automobile drivers from lawsuits by passengers
in their cars, commonly known as guest statutes. P was a passenger in
D's car. In this instance, the immunity trumps the right or potential right,
and P has no remedy against D.
A similar situation can arise in a multistate context. P and D are in
an accident in Virginia. P is a North Carolina citizen, and D is a Virginia
citizen. Virginia creates a right to recover damages in persons who are
injured by another's negligence in Virginia. P was injured by D's
negligence in Virgina. Thus, P has a potential right to receive compensation from D for hIs injuries. However, Virginia also provides an
immunity that passengers may not recover damages from drivers. The
statute's purpose is to prevent collusion between drivers and passengers
that raise Virginia insurance rates. Clearly, P has no remedy under
Virginia law.
Multistate interests are involved in this case because P is a North
Carolina citizen. North Carolina furmshes a potential right to its citizens
to recover when they are injured by another's negligence regardless of
where they are injured. North Carolina does not place any limitations on
tis right, so P would have a remedy against D - if North Carolina law
applies. However, a court must consider the Virgina inmumty because
D is a Virgina citizen. Considering the North Carolina right and the
Virgima immunity, can P recover damages against D9
A.

Step One: The Identification ofLegal Relations

The first step in choosing law is to identify the legal relations created
by the relevant states that might control a case. When step one reveals
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that more than one state's law might apply to the facts, then a court must
go on to step two - deciding which state's law should govern.
In the first step, the analyst identifies every legal relation that might
control the facts, as this author did m the above examples. However, one
should not use just any state law that might be relevant; one must
determine the law's scope - whether the lawmaker intended the law to
govern the situation.
For example, Virginia creates a right in a person who is injured by
another's negligence to recover damages from the negligent party What
is the scope of this right? It is reasonable to conclude that the lawmaker
intended the law to encompass accidents that occur in Virginia. Virginia
has an interest in regulating accidents that take place in that state.
Similarly, one can assume that Virginia intended its negligence rule to
apply to accidents occurring in other states in which its citizens are
injured because Virginia has an interest in ensuring that its citizens are
compensated for negligent injuries. However, it is not reasonable to
conclude that Virginia lawmakers intended that its negligence rule govern
accidents that take place in California between California citizens.
Virginia does not have an interest in regulating California highways, nor
does it have in interest in compensating California tort victims.
The above analysis resembles governmental interest analysis's
identification of state policies and interests. However, this author's
method examines states' interests to determine which states have created
legal relations that govern a controversy It does not use states' interests
to choose law when there is a true conflict.
Step one shows that many potential choice of law problems are not
problems at all because only one state's law applies to a situation. 142
There can be no conflict of laws if only one state creates a legal
14
relation.
Assume that Virginia provides a right to recover in persons who are
injured by another's negligence on Virginia highways or who are Virginia
citizens, and that North Carolina furnishes a similar right for North
Carolina. Also assume that Virginia has a guest statute that immunizes
Virginia defendants from lawsuits from passengers in their cars to protect
Virgima insurers from collusion between drivers and passengers. North
Carolina, however, places no limit on recovery for negligence. An
accident occurs in North Carolina in which P, a passenger in D's car and
a Virginia citizen, is injured by D, a North Carolina citizen.

142
143

Of course, this is also true of governmental interest analysis.
There is also no conflict if the states' laws are the same.
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There is no conflict of laws in this example, despite the fact that
parties from more than one state were involved. The Virginia guest
statute is irrelevant because Virginia lawmakers did not intend that it
govern accidents in other states involving non-Virgima defendants where Virginia insurers are not subject to collusion.
In some instances, no state will furnsh a legal relation. For example,
North Dakota provides a right of recovery for alienation of affections
when the tort occurs in North Dakota or when a North Dakota spouse is
involved. South Dakota has abolished the tort of alienation of affections.
A North Dakota resident alienates a South Dakota spouse's affections in
South Dakota. No legal relation is created. South Dakota does not have
an action for alienation of affections, and North Dakota's right does not
apply to the alienation of a South Dakota spouse's affections that occurs
in South Dakota.
Some cases involve true conflicts in which two states' laws govern
a situation. For instance, California creates a right to recover for breach
of contract for contracts entered into m California or with a California
resident, while Oregon has enacted an inmunity for its residents who
have been adjudged spendthrifts.'" Sam, an Oregon spendthrift, enters
into a contract in California with a California resident, and Sam breaches
the contract. California has an interest in upholding contracts, while
Oregon has an interest in protecting spendthrifts. Consequently, this case
presents a true conflict because both the California right to recover for
breach of contract and the Oregon immunity for spendthrifts applies to
the facts. Resolution of this conflict requires a second step, as set forth
below.
For another true conflict, consider a variation on the guest statute
hypothetical from above. Virginia furnshes a right to recover for
negligence for accidents that happen in Virginia or involve its residents.
Virginia, however, has a guest statute. North Carolina has a right for its
residents to recover for damages incurred from another's negligence. An
accident occurs near Charlottesville, Virginia involving a Virginia driver,
" A spendthrift is defined as:
One who spends money profusely and improvidently; a prodigal; one
who lavishes or wastes is estate. By statute, a person who by excessive
drinking, gaming, idleness, or debauchery of any kind shall so spend,
waste, or lessen his estate as to expose himself or his family to want or
sufferng, or expose the government to charge or expense for the
support of himself or family, or is liable to be put under guardianship
on account of such excesses.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1400 (6th ed. 1990).
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who was negligent, and a North Carolina passenger. Virginia does not
provide a remedy because of the guest statute. North Carolina creates a
right to recover in the passenger, but the Virginia minimuity also applies
because the Virginia guest statute encompasses Virgia defendants.
Consequently, a true conflict exists.
This author believes that when a state's law creates a legal relation
that a court must employ all other legal relations that go with it. In other
words, when a state's law establishes a right, a court applying that law
must also adopt the immunities or other legal relations that limit the right.
A court should not be able to choose only what legal relations it wants
to allow a remedy that would not exist in the state that created the legal
relations. For example, a court should not adopt a right such as a state's
negligence rule, but ignore the limiting inmunity, its guest statute. Tis
would permit a remedy when that state's legislature intended that both the
right and immunity apply to the facts. Similarly, a state should not
employ another state's wrongful death statute to provide a cause of
action, but disregard damages limitations m that statute.
This approach helps avoid forum shopping, and helps ensure that the
same law will govern regardless of forum. It also avoids creating a
cause of action that does not exist under any relevant state's law
Moreover, this requirement is not unfair; a plaintiff would not have had
a remedy under any applicable state law outside of the multistate context,
so it is not unfair that she does not have a remedy in a multistate
context.
The above refusal to separate legal relations that belong together is
most relevant for statutes of limitations. Under this author's approach to
choice of law, a court must adopt the statute of limitations of the state
that created the right.'45 Otherwise, it has provided a remedy that does
not exist under any state's law
On the other hand, governmental interest analysis might furnish a
remedy where none existed. For example, P is injured m Illinois by a
product manufactured in Indiana. Illinois has a cause of action for
products liability under both strict liability and negligence and has a oneyear tort statute of limitations. Indiana has a cause of action for products
liability only under negligence, with a two-year tort statute of limitations.

1' A state can change this by statute, applying either the statute of
limitations of the state that created the right or the forum's statute of limitations,
whichever is longer. However, in domg so, the forum is creating a new nght
under its law; it is not enforcing a right created by the other state's law because
that right does not exist separately from the statute of limitations.
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P files suit in Indiana thirteen months after he is injured. P can satisfy
the requirements for strict liability, but not negligence.
Under governmental interest analysis, P would recover. There would
be no cause of action under Indiana law because P cannot prove
negligence. However, P can prove strict liability, and Illinois has interest
in having its law adopted because it wants to regulate sales in Illinois. On
the other hand, Illinois has no interest in applying its statute of limitations
to cases that are brought in Indiana, and Indiana has an interest in using
its statute of limitations. Consequently, P can recover under the Illinois
right and the Indiana statute of limitations; a cause of action exists in a
multistate setting that does not exist under any state's law
Under tis author's analysis, P would not recover. Illinois creates no
cause of action because the action is barred by Illinois' statute of
limitations. Likewise, Indiana does not have strict liability
Some might view the above result as being unfair; P was mjured by
the product. However, if there is unfairness, the unfairness is not in
choice of law; it is in the states' choices of tort rules. P would not have
recovered under either states' laws, absent the multistate setting. A court
should not use choice of law for substantive justice; substantive justice
must exist in the legal relations furnished by state law
B. Step Two: ChoosingLaw When a True Conflicts Exists
Step one will eliminate many choice of law problems; conflicts
problems do not occur when only one state's law (or no state's law)
provides legal relationships that govern the facts. However, many
situations arise where two states create legal relations that apply to the
14 6
case - where a true conflict exists.
Part II of this Article discussed and evaluated other approaches to
true conflicts. 147 Currie would employ forum law with true conflicts as
long as the forum had an interest in applying its law This author
criticized tis solution because it promoted forum shopping and was
unfair to the litigants. Leflar would adopt the better rule. This author
criticized this approach because: (1) it is often difficult to tell what the
Tlus author's use of the term "true conflict" is different than Cume's.
This author employs true conflict to indicate those cases in wich the law of two
or more states create legal interests that govern the controversy. Currie uses true
conflict to mean that two or more states have policy interests m applying their
states' laws to the facts.
" See supra Part II (notes 58-106 and accompanying text).
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better rule is, (2) it is not substantively neutral, and (3) it is not fair to the
litigants. Kramer advocated using interpretive canons when true conflicts
exist. Tis author criticized Kramer's method because: (1) choice of law
is not interpretive on this level, (2) Kramer's approach does not solve all
conflicts problems, and (3) there should be a simpler solution.
This author believes there is a simple multilateralist solution, at least
in theory- adopt the law of the state that has the closest connection to the
controversy In doing so, one should look at connections that relate to the
laws that might be applicable ("relevant connections"), not to connections
to a state that are unrelated to the controversy For instance, the fact that
a person is doing business m Montana is not a relevant connection to an
automobile accident occurrng in Montana, unless doing business in
Montana is related to the accident.
A typical breach of contract case involving multistate parties
illustrates this author's closest connection step. P, a Georgia resident,
enters into an oral contract with D, a Florida resident. The contract was
negotiated and executed in Florida, and is to be performed entirely in
Florida. D breaches the contract. The contract is not enforceable under
Florida's statute of frauds, but it would be enforceable under Georgia's.
Florida has an interest in employing its statute of frauds to invalidate
contracts that do not conform to its statute to protect its residents and
those who enter into contracts in Florida from fraud. Georgia has an
interest in validating contracts entered into by its residents. Thus, both
states create legal relations that apply to the controversy, and a true
conflict exists.
Under this author's approach, Florida law would govern these facts
because the legal relations created by Florida law have the closest
connection to the situation. The contract was executed, negotiated, and to
be performed in Florida, all significant connections. The only connection
Georgia has with the controversy is that one of the contracting parties is
domiciled there; a relevant connection, but not strong enough to
overcome the stronger connections with Florida. In addition, the parties
would probably expect that a contract negotiated, executed, and to be
performed in Florida would be governed by Florida law
Consider a true conflict in a guest statute setting. An accident occurs
in Virginia involving D, a Virgina resident, and her passenger, P, a
North Carolina resident. Virgina creates a right to recover for injuries
caused by negligence, but has a guest statute. North Carolina provides a
cause of action when its residents are injured by negligence, and it has
abolished its guest statute. Thus, North Carolina furishes a cause of
action for P, while Virginia establishes an immunity for D Which state's
law governs? In this case, the accident occurred in Virginia and the
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defendant is a Virginia resident. The only contact with North Carolina is
that P is a North Carolina resident, and D lacks any relevant connection
with North Carolina.14 8 Consequently, the closest connections are with
Virginia.
In the above examples, the states' laws that this author thought should
govern the facts had more relevant connections with the situations than
did the states' laws that were not applied. However, this does not mean
that choice of law is simply counting connections. The step two inquiry
is both quantitative and qualitative; some connections are more important
than others. For example, in a breach of contract case, the place of the
contract's performance is usually more significant than one of the parties'
domicile."'
One connection that has no relevance in ths author's approach is
forum - that a case is brought in a jurisdiction should not count in the
choice of law analysis. Thus, in the first example above, Florida law
should govern regardless of the place of the trial, and, in the second
example, any court that hears the case should apply Virginia law
While this author's second step is theoretically simpler than many
choice of law approaches, it leaves open the possibility that courts will
differ on which state's law has the closest connection to the facts. 5 ° Of
course, the possibility that courts will reach different conclusions on the
same facts is an intrinsic part of our legal system.
The following example illustrates a close case. P, a Mississippi
resident, is badly injured in a traffic accident in Mississippi, by D1, an
Alabama resident, who was legally drunk under both states' laws at the
time of the accident. DI is insolvent and cannot compensate P for hIs
injunes, despite the fact the D1 was negligent per se. Consequently, P
sues D2, an Alabama tavern owner, who served D1 the alcohol and was
aware that Dl was inebriated. Mississippi has a law that holds tavern
Lack of relevant connections to ajunsdiction is also important in step two
of this author's method. When a party has no relevant connection to a junsdiction, he would not expect that that state's law would apply to him.
"4 For more illustrations on how this works, see the examples set forth infra
Part V (notes 156-236 and accompanying text).
"' One might criticize thls author's system for leaving too much discretion
to the judge in deciding which state has the closest connection with a controversy. However, this author does not want to repeat Beale's mistake of developing
ngid, mechanical rules. The most important aspect of this author's closest
connection step is that the judge determine the controversy without reference to
the substantive outcome. This system leaves open the possibility thatjudges will
differ in evaluating connections.
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owners liable for injuries drunk drivers cause if the tavern owner knew
or should have known that the customer was inebriated. The law's
purpose is to compensate mjured parties and to regulate the service of
alcohol to reduce the number and seventy of accidents. Alabama has an
immumty from liability for tavern owners from persons who are injured
by drunk drivers. The Alabama law's purpose is to engender responsibility in all drivers and to avoid placing the burden of drunk driving
injuries on tavern owners who often cannot tell when a customer is
legally drunk. Thus, a true conflict exists with Mississippi creating a
cause of action for P against D2, and Alabama law providing an
immuity for the tavern owner.
It is difficult to predict what state's law a court will apply to the
above facts - both states have close connections to the controversy The
accident occurred in Mississippi, and P is a resident of that state. On the
other hand, the tavern owner is an Alabama resident, and he served the
drinks in Alabama.' In the present case, this author would adopt
Mississippi law to give P a cause of action because the fact that the
accident occurred in Mississippi seems more significant than the fact that
the drinks were sold in Alabama. In addition, P has no connection to
Alabama and would not expect that Alabama law would apply, but the
tavern owner should have known that D1 might drive into Mississippi.
In the above example, it might be tempting for courts to fall back on
traditional choice of law devices. For example, an Alabama court would
be tempted to apply Alabama law, while a Mississippi judge would be
inclined to adopt her state's rule. Similarly, ajudge's choice of law might
be influenced by.how he felt about a tavern owner's responsibility and
personal responsibility This author rejects such temptations because they
are not forum and substantively neutral. The only inquiry in the second
step is which state's law has the closest connection to the controversy
That tis decision might be difficult is not a reason to ignore the
requirements of the choice of law system.
C. Evaluation of Choice of Law Method
While the reader may normatively disagree with this author's
multilateralist choice of law method,'5 2 it satisfies the requirements set

"' D1 was also an Alabama resident, but this is probably irrelevant unless
D2 knew that D1 was an Alabama resident, which would have meant that it was
less likely that D1 would be driving in Mississippi.
'52As Professor Brilmayer points out, "[t]he fundamental and unavoidable
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forth in Part rn.153 First, the approach is grounded in positive law It
first determines what legal relations are provided by the states that might
have a connection with the facts. It does not adopt a state's law unless
that state has created a legal relation that applies to the facts.
The choice of law approach is substantively neutral. It examines the
legal relations created by the states, and it examines the scope of those
relations without judging the wisdom of the rule. Then, with true
conflicts, it chooses law, not based on substantive criteria, but on which
state has the closest connection to the facts.
The system is also forum neutral. In the system, choice of law does
not depend on where the suit is filed. With true conflicts, a judge must
adopt the law of the state that has the closest connection to the controversy, even if his state's interest is ignored.
The system is predictable. Parties will know that when two states
create legal relations that a court will use the law of the state with the
closest connection to the controversy The outcome will not depend on
in which forum the case is filed or which state's law the judge believes
is the better rule. 4
The system reflects the relevant states' interests. It looks to the
interests and policies of the relevant states when determining what the
legal relations are and the scope of those relations. Although it does not
directly consider the states' interest m the second step, choosing law in
cases of true conflicts, the approach's outcome furthers the states'
interests. The second step chooses the law of the state with the closest
connection to the controversy Thus, under the approach, a state's interest
will be furthered when a state has the closest connection to a controversy,
and the state's interest will yield when another state has the closest
connection. Tins author believes that adopting a state's law when it has
the closest connection to a case but requiring that state to yield its interest
when another state has a closer connection is the best solution to choice
of law in a multijurisdictional setting.

problem of choice of law is one of perspective
Tins is a question of the
proper normative grounding, of what is the appropnate foundation for choice of
law." BRiLMAYER, supra note 3, at 1.
...
See supra notes 107-41 and accompanying text.
'14 As noted above, tis author does not claim that the system
will always
produce the same result m all similar cases. For example, judges will differ on
the scope of a statute or rule and which state's law has the closest connection to
the facts. Still, this author believes that tins method is more predictable than
existing systems.
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Finally, tlus author's method is fair to the litigants. First, a state
cannot apply its law to a situation unless that state has established a legal
relation that governs that situation. A significant connection to the
controversy will not be enough when the legal relation the court wants to
employ was not intended to encompass the facts. Second, a judge cannot
use choice of law to produce a judge's notion of substantive fairness in
contravention to the body that created the law that should govern.
Substantive justice depends on substantive decisions, not choice of law
Third, choice of law is forum neutral - a case's outcome does not hinge
on the place where the lawsuit is filed. Fourth, choice of law is more
predictable for the reasons set forth above. This allows parties to conduct
their behavior and structure their business transactions to conform to the
law
This author believes that the major element of fairness m this system
is that it conforms to the parties' expectations. Parties will usually expect
that a court will apply the law of the state with the closest connection to
the controversy ...They will not be surprised when a state's rule that
they thought had no relevance to the lawsuit governs the case's outcome.
V
A.

EXTENDED EXAMPLES

Emery v Emery

Among the issues in Emery v. Emery'56 was whether family tort
immunity nullified the plaintiffs' causes of action for reckless disregard
negligence. Two minor daughters, who were California domicilianes,
were injured in an automobile accident in Idaho caused by the alleged
recklessness of their brother, the driver of the car in which the daughters
were passengers.' 57 Justice Traynor looked to Idaho law to determine
whether there was a cause of action, as is required under the vested rights
approach. Notably, he applied the Idaho guest statute, which allowed suits
by passengers against drivers only when the driver's conduct is intentional or is caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of other's
rights.. 58
155 This is true even m torts cases. One of the purposes of torts is to cause
people to conform their behavior to the law. Obviously, people try to conform
their behavior to the law they think applies.
116 Emery v Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955).
1 Id. at 220.
158 Id. at 221.
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The next question was whether family tort ummumty negated the
sister's remedy Idaho apparently would have employed the family tort
immunity doctrine, but there was no California law on whether minors
can sue family members for malicious or willful torts. If California law
applied, Justice Traynor could follow the modem trend and refuse to
apply family tort ilmmuity 159
Justice Traynor used characterization combined with language that
sounds like governmental interest analysis to find that California law
applied. Traynor stated that three jurisdictions' laws might govern this
case: (1) the law of the place where the mjury occurred, (2) forum law,
or (3) the law of the family's domicile.16 Although one case had
applied the law of the place where the injury occurred, which is the
normal rule under Beale's approach, Traynor thought that the question
was not one of tort, but of the "capacity to sue and be sued.' 6 ' Traynor pointed out that in such a case "the place of injury is both fortuitous
and irrelevant."' 62 One case on the issue had held that forum law
applies, and analogous cases concerning husband-wife immumty had also
applied forum law 163 Justice Traynor then declared that:
We think that disabilities to sue and immunities from suit because of a
family relationship are more properly determined by reference to the
law of the state of the family domicile. That state has the primary
responsibility for establishing and regulating the incidents of the family
relationship and it is the only state in which the parties can, by
participation in the legislative process, effect a change in those
incidents. Moreover, it is undesirable that the rights, duties, disabilities,
and immunities conferred or imposed by the family relationship should
constantly change as members of the family cross state boundaries
during temporary absences from their home.'
Thus, Traynor used characterization from Beale's approach, along with
principles from governmental interest analysis that the domicile has the
159 Id. at

222. This does not violate tis author's requirement that choice of
law should be substantively neutral. Justice Traynor changed the California
substantive rule; he did not mampulate choice of law to obtain the result he felt
was just.
160 Id.
161

id.

162 Id.
163 Id.

164 1d. at 223.
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interest in regulating family relationships, to find that California law
governed and the daughters could recover.
Tis author's method would produce a similar result. California
provides a right for its citizens to recover when they are injured by
another's negligence, regardless of the place of the negligence. California
does not have family tort immunity, at least when reckless disregard is
involved. Idaho creates a right for persons to recover for negligence that
occurs in Idaho (in order to regulate conduct), but it has family tort
immunity However, the Idaho family tort immunity only encompasses
Idaho families, not California families that are only temporarily in Idaho.
Consequently, there is no conflict because California establishes a right,
while the Idaho immunity does not apply
The analysis of the above example was based on the assumption that
Idaho intended to apply family tort immunity only to Idaho families. This
is probably correct because Idaho has no interest in regulating California
families. But assume that the Idaho legislature specifically stated that its
family tort immunity rule applied to all accidents happening in Idaho,
which it could do under the Due Process Clause 6 ' because there is a
significant connection to Idaho, the accident occurred there. In this case
there is a true conflict - both the California right to recover and the
Idaho immunity govern the facts. Idaho's connection to the controversy
is that the accident took place there. California's connection is that the
family is domiciled there. Although the relevant connections are
equivalent quantitatively, the California connection is more significant
qualitatively Where a family lives is more inportant in relation to family
tort immumty than where an accident occurs, especially considering the
fact that the family was only temporarily in Idaho.
B.

Alabama Great Southern Railroad v Carroll

Alabama Great Southern Railroadv. Carroll'66 involved the issue
of whether the plaintiff's claim for negligence was barred by Mississippi's fellow servant rule. Plaintiff, an Alabama resident and a railroad
brakeman, was injured in Mississippi when a link between two railroad
cars broke while a tram was going from Alabama to Mississippi. The
accident was caused by the failure of the Alabama railroad's employees
165
166

U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1.
Alabama Great S. R.R. v Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892).
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to inspect67the link between the cars properly before the train left
Alabama.

1

The plaintiff's lawsuit would have been barred if Mississippi law
governed because Mississippi had adopted the fellow servant rule (an
employee cannot recover from hIs employer based on another employee's
negligence). 161 On the other hand, the brakeman would have had a
cause of action under Alabama law because Alabama had abrogated the
fellow servant rule by statute. 169 Using the vested rights rule that the
place of injury governs,170 the court found that the fellow servant rule
barred plaintiff's claim.
Under ths author's approach, no conflict exists. Alabama establishes
a right to recover for mjunes caused by negligence when the injury
occurs in Alabama, the negligence occurs in Alabama, or when Alabama
citizens are involved. In this case, the negligence occurred in Alabama,
and the plaintiff was an Alabama resident. Because there was no
limitation on the plaintiffs right to recover under Alabama law, the
brakeman had a claim under Alabama law.
The brakeman had no cause of action under Mississippi law because
of the fellow servant rule. However, this author thinks that the fellow
servant rule does not create an immunty for the railroad that produces a
true conflict. This author believes that7 the Mississippi rule is intended
only to protect Mississippi employers.' '
C. Grant v McAuliffe
Grant v. McAuliffe77 restates the "place of the wrong" rule for
torts, although one can see Justice Traynor grasping for another approach.
Id. at 804.
Id.
169 Id. at 808.
170 Id. at 809.
171 On the other hand, Mississippi might have also intended that its fellow
servant rule apply to accidents occurring in Mississippi, in which case there
would be a true conflict. As stated above, this author's system, while more
predictablethan existing approaches, cannot be totally predictablebecausejudges
will differ as to a law's scope. If a true conflict exists in this case, the
brakeman should still be able to recover because Alabama has the closest
connection to the lawsuit based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the
facts, the only relevant connection to Mississippi being that the accident took
place there.
172 Grant v McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
167
168
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In Grant, three plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident in
Arizona. The other car's driver died nineteen days after the accident.
When the plaintiffs made claims against the driver's estate, the admimstrator rejected them because Arizona law did not provide for survival of
causes of action. The plaintiffs, the decedent, and the administrator were
California residents.'
The plaintiffs sued the admnistrator in California state court. The
administrator filed a general demurrer and a motion to abate the complaints, arguing that under Arizona law a cause of action does not survive
the tortfeasor's death. The trial court granted the motions, and the
plaintiffs appealed. 4
The California Supreme Court reversed. Justice Traynor restated the
vested rights rule that the law of the place where the tortious act occurs
governs substantive matters. However, he continued by declaring that the
forum does not adopt the procedural rules of the place where the tortious
act took place." 5 Characterizing survival of causes of action as procedural, Traynor employed California law, which allowed victims to bring
76
negligence suits against estates.
This author's analysis of Grant is similar to the analysis of Carroll.
Arizona creates a right of recovery for persons injured in Arizona by
another's negligence. This right, however, is predicated on the tortfeasor's
survival. If the tortfeasor dies, the injured party does not have a claim
against the tortfeasor's estate under Arizona law The reason behind the
rule is to protect Arizona estates, so the survival statute has no force
outside Arizona - the survival statute does not apply to California

estates. 177
The plaintiff has a cause of action under California law California
provides a right in its citizens to recover damages when the citizen is
injured by another's negligence, regardless of the place of injury, and it
'73
74
1

175

Id. at 946.
Id.
id.

Id. at 949
This case illustrates a problem in Beale's mechanical approach. Under
Beale's approach, which was apparently used by the lower court, the Arizona
survival statute bars the cause of action because the accident occurred in Arizona.
However, Arizona has not created a legal relation that governs the controversy
because Arizona did not intend its survival rule to apply to California estates.
One can make similar criticisms of the outcome under Beale's method in Emery
and Alabama Southern.
176

177
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has no survival statute. Therefore, there is no conflict m tis case, and the
plaintiff has a remedy
D. Hurtado v Superior Court
An analysis of Hurtado v. Superior Court7 ' illustrates the differences between governmental interest analysis and tis author's method in
the context of a wrongful death suit. In this case, the plaintiff's decedent
was killed in an automobile accident in California in which the defendant
was at fault. The decedent and Is family were Mexican domiciliaries,
and the decedent was m California temporarily The defendant, his
cousin, was a California resident, and the three veicles involved m the
"'
accident were registered m Califorma. 79
Both Mexico and California had wrongful death actions, but Mexico
limited recovery to approximately $1946.72, to protect resident defendants from excessive financial burdens.8 0 California had no limitation
because it wanted to compensate decedents' beneficiaries fully and
because it wanted to deter conduct within its borders that wrongfully
takes a life.'
In deciding whether the Mexican wrongful death limitation governed,
the court applied governmental interest analysis. The court stated that
"Califoria as the forum should apply its own measure of damages for
wrongful death, unless Mexico has an interest in having its measure of
damages applied.""8 2 The court recognzed three aspects of wrongful
death actions: "(1) compensation for survivors, (2) deterrence of conduct
and (3) limitation, or lack thereof, upon the damages recoverable."'8 3
The third aspect, the one involved in this case, "insofar as defendants are
concerned, reflects the state's interest in protecting resident defendants
from excessive financial burdens."' 84 Consequently, on the limitation
of damages issue, California has an interest in applying its wrongful death
statute without limitation to deter conduct within California, while
Mexico has no interest in employing its wrongful death limitation because
Mexican defendants are not involved. Thus, there is no conflict.

178

Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).

179

Id. at 668.

Id. at 674.
"I Id. at 672.
182 Id. at 670.
183 Id. at 672.
180

184Id.
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This author's method reaches the same result by looking at whether
the relevant states have created a legal relation that applies to the facts.
California provides a wrongful death action without a damages limitation
because its wrongful death statute encompasses injuries that occur in
California. Mexico's wrongful death statute could also allow recovery for
the plaintiff because it is intended to encompass wrongful deaths of
Mexican nationals. However, the wrongful death limitation does not apply
because it only protects Mexican defendants, and the defendant is from
Californa.8' Thus, there is no conflict because Mexico has not created
a legal relation that governs the controversy
In sum, the difference between this author's method and governmental interest analysis is that this author's method looks to see whether a
state has created a legal relation that governs the facts, while governmental interest analysis tries to determine whether a state has an interest in
applying its law This author does analyze a state's interest in applying
its law to determine the law's scope.
E.

Ryan v Clark Equipment Co.

In Hurtado, the court discusses a similar case, Ryan v. Clark
Equipment Co., 86 decided by the Califorma Court of Appeals. In Ryan,
the plaintiff's husband, an Oregon resident, was killed in that state while
operating a front-end loader for his Oregon employers. The plaintiff
brought an action in California on behalf of the decedent's heirs, all
Oregon residents, agamst the Michigan manufacturer of the front-end
loader. Jurisdiction was proper in California because the Michigan
manufacturer did business in Califorma. Oregon limited wrongful death
recovery to $20,000 and provided that other amounts recovered because
of the wrongful death must be offset against damages recovered in the
wrongful death action. Since the plaintiff had already received $35,000,
she would not be able to recover any damages in a wrongful death action
if Oregon law controlled."i 7
185 In the alternative, one could analyze the limitation of liability as being
inseparable from the Mexican wrongful death act. In other words, it does not
apply to wrongful death acts of other jurisdictions.
186 Ryan v. Clark Equip. Co., 74 Cal. Rptr. 329 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
Because there are analytical errors in Ryan, this analysis will employ the correct
presentation of Ryan's facts from Hurtado.See supraPart V.D (notes 178-85 and
accompanying text).
187 Ryan, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 330-31.
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The court declared that both Oregon and Michigan had an interest in
applying their wrongful death statutes. Oregon is interested In protecting
defendant's financial security by limiting damages because defendant did
business in Oregon, while Michgan had an interest in allowing unlimited
liability m order to deter the manufacturer's conduct' 88 The California
Court of Appeals resolved this true conflict by deciding that Oregon's interest
"overrides any possible concern of Michigan in the
regulation of activities of
18 9
law.
Oregon
employing
by
and
manufacturers,"
This author's analysis produces a similar result.19 Oregon creates a
limited wrongful death action to protect Oregon defendants. Michigan has a
wrongful death action that permits unlimited liability, which applies to
injuries caused by products manufactured in Michigan, regardless of where
the injury occurs, because Michigan wants to deter Michigan manufacturers'
negligence. Thus, the limitation of damages issue presents a true conflict
Oregon has the closest connection to the controversy because the accident
occurred there, the employers were Oregon residents, and the decedent and
his family were Oregon citizens, while the only relevant connection with
Michgan was that the front-end loader was manufactured there. Consequently, this author's analysis reaches the same conclusion as Ryan, but by
determining which state has the closest connection to the controversy, not by
weighing.
F

Milliken v. Pratt

In Milliken v. Pratt,9' a much-discussed choice of law case, 192 Mrs.
Pratt executed a guaranty of her husband's credit in favor of a Maine
"88 Id. at 331.
189

Id.

Two choice of law approaches might have allowed unlimited damages.
Under the better rule approach, the court could have determined that the
Michigan rule was the better rule and applied Michigan law.
The court could have also employed governmental interest analysis. In Ryan,
the court used some interest analysis, but made the final determination by
weighing, a method Curne explicitly rejected. Id. at 331-32. Under classic
governmental interest analysis with true conflicts, the forum, California, had no
interest in applying its law, or, for that matter, the law of the other two states.
In such an instance, Califorma could apply the rule that was the same as its own.
In this case, Califorma had an unlimited wrongful death action, so it could have
allowed full recovery for the plaintiff. However, this author disagrees with such
a result because choice of forum is outcome determinative.
191Milliken v Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
192 E.g., CuRPi,,
supra note 59, at 77-127; Cook, supra note 46, at 471.
190
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partnership. She executed the guaranty at her home in Massachusetts, and
her husband mailed it to Maine. Mr. Pratt defaulted on his debts, and the
partnership sued Mrs. Pratt on her guaranty in Massachusetts. 93 Under
a Maine statute, a married woman could be held liable as a surety,' 94
but, under Massachusetts law, a married woman could not bind herself as
a surety 195
The court reversed a trial court judgment for the defendant on the
ground that Maine law governed. The court analyzed Mrs. Pratt's
guaranty as an offer for a unilateral contract that was accepted by goods
delivered to the buyer or to the buyer's carer. 196 Since the goods were
delivered in Maine, Maine law governed. Consequently, the Maine statute
applied, and the guaranty was valid.' 97
Governmental interest analysis yields an opposite result.'98 Both
Massachusetts and Maine have an interest in applying their laws.
Massachusetts wants to protect mamed woman, whom at that time it
believed needed special protection. Maine, on the other hand, has an
interest in freedom of contract. Since the suit was filed in Massachusetts,
the court should apply Massachusetts law, voiding the contract. Concern.ing this situation, Cume declared, "if one state's policy must yield,
should not the court prefer the policy of its own state?"' 99
If the creditor had filed the lawsuit m Maine, a court employing
governmental interest analysis would have upheld the contract. Both
states have an interest in applying their laws, and, in such a case, the
forum should further its interest and adopt its law Thus, Milliken's
outcome under governmental interest analysis hinges solely on the forum
where the action is filed.
A court applying the better rule approach would uphold the guaranty
because the Maine rule is the better rule. While it is obvious that the
Maine rule is the better rule in hindsight, which rule was the better rule
Milliken, 125 Mass. at 241-42.
Id. at 243.
195Id. at 249
196 Id. at 243. The court could have just as easily found the place of the
making of the contract to be Massachusetts. The Maine creditor offered to sell
Mrs. Pratt's husband goods in exchange for Mrs. Pratt's signing the guaranty. Id.
at 241-42. Thus, one can conclude that the place of the making of the contract
is Massachusetts where Mrs. Pratt accepted the offer. This case again illustrates
how courts can manipulate their analysis to obtain the desired result.
'9'
Id. at 249..
198 CURRIE, supra note 59, at 90.
193

194

199Id.
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was not as clear in the Nineteenth Century Similarly, states have the
right to differ on what is the better rule. If protecting mamed women is
not the better rule, Massachusetts should change its substantive law, not
use choice of law to obtain a desired result on an ad hoc basis.
Under this author's approach, a true conflict exists. Maine creates a
cause of action to recover on the guaranty, while Massachusetts furnshes
an immunity that negates any right to recover on a Massachusetts mamed
woman's contracts.
This author would adopt Massachusetts law because it has the closest
connection to the controversy Mrs. Pratt was a Massachusetts domiciliary, and she entered into the contract there. The contract was to be
performed in Massachusetts; Mrs. Pratt would have paid the guaranty
there. On the other hand, the only primary connection to Maine was that
the partnership was a Maine domiciliary, a connection that is not as
significant as the connections to Massachusetts."'
G. Lilienthal v Kaufman
Lilienthal v. Kaufman,0 1 involved the issue of whether an Oregon
spendthrift statute voided promissory notes executed and delivered in
California in a case brought in Oregon. D had been adjudged a spendthrift,2 2 and, under Oregon law, a spendthrift's guardian could void a
spendthrift's contracts, except for necessaries. D had entered into a
promissory note with a California resident to finance a joint venture to
sell binoculars. P was unaware that D had been declared a spendthrift and
20 3
placed under a guardianship. The guardian declared the notes void.
There is no doubt that the court would have declared the notes void
if only Oregon law was involved. The court had declared the same
spendthrift's obligation to repay the unpaid balance of a check void based
on almost identical facts.20 4 Consequently, the only issue in this case
involved choice of law
The court began by determinmg that there was a true conflict - the
obligation was enforceable under Califorma law, but not under Oregon
law 205 The court also decided that it could not decide the matter by
It is true that the contract that Mrs. Pratt guaranteed was to be performed
in Maine, but this author considers this fact secondary.
20' Lilienthal v. Kaufinan, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
202 For a definition of spendthrift, see supra note 144.
203 Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 543.
2040 lshen v. Kaufman, 385 P.2d 161 (Or. 1963).
205 Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545-46.
200
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characterization. The defendant had urged that the Oregon court should
not apply California law because the validity of a contract is a matter
of procedure, not substance. However, the court found that the issue was
one of6 substance under standard definitions of substance and proce20
dure.
The plaintiff contended that the issue of a contract's validity is
governed by the place of the contract's making - in this case Califorma.217 This is the rule under Beale's approach, and Oregon had restated
this rule for many years.2"' However, the rule had also been under
attack for many years, mainly on the ground that the place of the
contract's making is often fortuitous, and in such a case the state of the
contract's making has no interest in the parties or the contract's performance. Still, the court refused to overrule the lex loci contractusprinciple
because the contract had other connections to California - (1) the
defendant had gone to California to obtain the loan, (2) the plaintiff was
a California resident, (3) the money was loaned in Califorma, and (4) the
money was to be repaid in San Francisco." 9 Based on the above, the
court stated that "apart from lex loci contractus,other accepted principles
of conflict of laws leads to the conclusion that the law of California
should be applied."'2 10
The court also felt that California law should govern based on the
"rule of validation" - if a contract is valid under the law of any
jurisdiction having a significant connection to the contract, the court will
adopt the law of the jurisdiction that validates the contract.2 1 This IS
because "[i]n the general law of2 contracts
we constantly strive to hold the
12
contract valid and enforceable.
Despite the above, the Oregon court refused to enforce the contract
because Oregon had a strong public policy against enforcing spendthrifts'
contracts. 13 The court conceded that both the California and Oregon
interests were of substance, and that neither was more important than the
other. Nevertheless, the court declared that "[w]e are of the opinion that
in such a case that the public policy of Oregon should prevail and the law
Id. at 546.
Id.
201 See, e.g., Erwm v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).
209 Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545-46.
210 Id. at 546.
211 Id.
206

207

212 Id.

213

Id. at 546-49.
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of Oregon should be applied; we should apply that choice-of-law rule
which will 'advance the policies or interests of' Oregon."2 4
Of course, this choice of law analysis, as well as the Oregon court's
actual decision, places the validity of some California contracts m
had no way of
doubt." 5 The plaintiff did not know, and apparently
216
knowing, that the defendant was a spendthrift.
These facts also demonstrate the problem with using the better rule
approach, as well as any method that is not substantively neutral. Wich
rule is the better rule - that the validity of contracts should be upheld to
provide predictability in the commercial world or that a spendthrift should
be protected?
This author's method would produce a different result from the one
the Oregon court reached - mainly, because it is jurisdiction neutral.
Oregon upholds the validity of contracts, but provides an immunity from
obligations made by Oregon spendthrifts to protect spendthrifts and their
families, so there is no remedy under Oregon law California upholds the
validity of contracts and has no spendthrift immunity However, the
Oregon legislature intended that its spendthrift statute encompass
contracts made by Oregon residents outside of Oregon, so a true conflict
exists.
Under tlus author's second step, one looks to the state that has the
closest connection to the controversy Oregon has only one relevant
connection to the facts - the defendant is an Oregon resident, but this is
a significant connection as it relates to the spendthrift statute.217 The
majority of the relevant connections, however, are with Californa, and
they are also significant - the defendant executed the notes in Califorma,
the plaintiff gave the money to the defendant in Californa, the plaintiff
is a California resident, and the money was to be repaid in California.
Based on this quantitative and qualitative analysis of these facts, a court
should apply California law and uphold the contract.
The above result advances Califorma's interest in upholding the
validity of contracts connected with California, at the expense of
Oregon's interest m protecting spendthrifts. However, Oregon's interest
Id. at 549 (quoting Hill, GovernmentalInterestsand the Conflict ofLaws
- A Reply to Professor Cume, 27 U. CHI. L. REv 463 (1960)).
215 As is true of many cases decidedunder governmental interest analysis, the
result would be exactly the opposite if the case had been filed in California.
216 Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 544.
217 As stated above, the fact that the lawsuit was filed in Oregon is irrelevant.
214
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is not as impaired as ohe might think because the facts have a closer
21 8
connection to California than Oregon.
H.

Auten v Auten

Auten v. Auten,219 which involved the issue of whether a wife had
repudiated a separation agreement, illustrates the difference between my
method and the "center of gravity" approach. The plaintiff wife and
defendant husband were mamed in England and had two children. The
husband deserted the wife, obtained a Mexican divorce, and, apparently,
moved to New York. The wife traveled to New York to discuss their
differences, and the parties entered into a separation agreement. Under the
agreement, a trustee was to pay the wife £50 a month for the support of
the wife and children, who would continue to live in England. 220 The
agreement stated that the parties were to live separately and provided that
"neither should sue 'in any action relating to their separation' and that the
[the
wife should not 'cause any complaint to be lodged against
husband], m any jurisdiction, by reason of the said alleged divorce or
marriage.' "1221
The husband soon breached the agreement, leaving his family
destitute. The wife brought an action against the husband in England for
separation and asked for an order for the husband to pay alimony
pendente lite. The wife allegedly filed this action to enable her to enforce
thought of repudiating it.
the separation agreement, not with any
222
tral.
to
came
never
case
the
Apparently,
Several years later, the wife sued the husband in New York to
recover $26,564 that the husband allegedly owed her under the separation
agreement. The husband defended on the ground that the English action
repudiated the separation agreement. The trial court granted summary
judgment based on New York law, agreeing that the English action's
Professor Kramerwould apparentlydisagree with this conclusion. Kramer,
supra note 93, at 303. Using hIs comparative impairment canon, he thinks that
the Oregon policy behind the spendthrift statute is more impaired than the
California policy of establishing a secure commerial environment. Id. On the
other hand, this author believes that determining winch state's policy is more
impaired is as difficult and as subjective as establishing wlch jurisdiction has
the better rule.
29 Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y 1954).
220 Id. at 100.
221 Id. (alteration in original).
218

MId.
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commencement had repudiated the separation agreement. An intermediate
appellate court affiimed.223
The Court of Appeals overturned the lower courts' decisions because
English, not New York, law applied. In doing so, the court adopted the
"center of gravity" test, which resembles the "most significant relationship" test later used by the Second Restatement.224 "Under this theory,
the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the
place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the
place 'which has the most significant contacts with the matter m
dispute.' ,2'5 The court advocated this approach because "it gives to the
place 'having the most interest in the problem' paramount control over
the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing
the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately
concerned with the outcome of [the] particular litigation.' , 2 6 It also
gives "effect to the probable intention of the parties and consideration
to
227
result."'
practical
best
the
produces
other
the
or
rule
one
'whether
Using the center of gravity test, the court concluded that English law
"must be applied to determine the impact and effect to be given the
wife's institution of the separation suit.122 The court thought that
England had all the significant contacts with the case, while New York's
sole contacts with the dispute was that it was the place of the contract's
making and the place where the trustee had hIs office. The court pointed
out that the wife's sole purpose in making the trip to New York was to
get her husband to support his family; she returned to England shortly
after the agreement was signed.229 The separation agreement:
[F]ixed the marital responsibilities of an English husband and father and
provided for the support and maintenance of the allegedly abandoned
wife and children who were to remain in England.
There is no
question that England has the greatest concern in prescribing and
221 Id. at 101.
224

Id.

Id. at 101-02 (quoting Rubm v. Irving Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 424, 431
(N.Y 1953)).
226 Id. at 102 (quoting Note, Choice of Law Problems in Direct Actions
Against Indemnification Insurers, 3 UTAH L. REv 498, 498-99 (1953))
(alteration
in original).
227
Id. (quoting Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 19 N.E.2d 992, 995 (N.Y
1939)).
228
Id.
229 Id.
225
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governing those obligations, and in securing to the wife and children
essential support and maintenance.230
Tis author disagrees with several of the factual determinations and
conclusions in Auten. First, the court was wrong that the only contacts
with New York were that the contract was made in New York and that
the trustee was resident there. The court omitted the sigmficant fact that
the husband lived in New York at the time the agreement was executed.
Second, the court focused on the wrong subject matter - the marriage,
rather the subject matter actually involved m the case - the separation
agreement. The wife was not suing for support because the husband had
a duty to support her because they had been mramed, but because the
husband owed her money under the separation agreement. Moreover, this
author thinks that the husband could have reasonably believed that New
York law governed the separation agreement's performance, considering
that he lived in New York at the time of its execution, it was executed
in New York, and the money was to be paid to the trustee in New York
(who would then send it to England).
There are really two issues concerning whether the wife's mitiation
of the lawsuit repudiated the separation agreement. First, what was the
legal meaning of the lawsuit's institution in England? Because the lawsuit
was an English lawsuit, only English law is relevant to this issue. Second,
did the initiation of the lawsuit, considering its legal meaning under
English law, repudiate the separation agreement? A court might answer
this question using either English or New York law
Under this author's method, a true conflict exists for the second issue.
New York law could apply to the facts because the separation agreement
was executed there, it was to be partly performed there, and one of the
parties to the agreement lived there when it was entered into and at least
part of the time when it was being performed. England also had a
connection to the facts that would allow the use of English law because
the wife and children lived in England and the separation agreement was
to be partially performed there.
Concerning the second step of this author's method, New York
connections included: (1) the separation agreement was entered into in
New York, (2) the husband lived in New York at the time of execution
and for at least part of the time of performance, and (3) the husband's
performance was to be made in New York. England's connections
included: (1) the wife and children lived there and (2) the contract was

230

Id. at 103.
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to be partially performed m England. Since the connections with New
York and England concerning domicile and contract performance seem
equal, the fact that the parties executed the contract in New York tips
the balance toward New York. Consequently, looking only at the
separation agreement and the facts pertaining to it, and ignoring the
husband's duty to support his family outside the separation agreement
(which was not at issue m Auten), this author believes that New York
has the closest connection to the controversy If the Court of Appeals
agreed with the lower courts that under New York law the wife's action
repudiated the separation agreement, then the wife had no cause of
action.
The above result seems substantively unfair. The wife and children
are left destitute by a selfish father, and the only reason the separation
agreement was entered into m New York was because that was the only
place that the wife could find her husband. But is the unfair result caused
by choice of law9 Consider the same facts except that the wife lived in
Albany, New York, rather than England. Since there is only one
jurisdiction involved, a New York court would have had to adopt New
York law and tell the wife to go home penniless. The Court of Appeals
implied that the lower courts' rulings may have been wrong concernng
what is required under New York law for a repudiation, " ' and analysis
of the substantive law would have been a preferable method for exacting
substantive justice, instead of setting a choice of law precedent that may
produce a substantively unfair result in another case.
.

Levy v Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co.

Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co. 23 2 presents a situation
where persons using this author's system may differ concerning which
state's law to apply In Levy, a person rented a car in Connecticut from
the defendant, an automobile rental company The renter drove it to
Massachusetts, where he mjured the plaintiff by the negligent operation
of the car. Under Massachusetts law, the plaintiff had no right to recover
from the car rental company based on a lessee's negligence.2 33 On the
other hand, Connecticut had a statute that stated "[a]ny person renting or
leasing to another any motor vehicle owned by him shall be liable to any
Id. at 101.
2 Levy v. Daniels U-Dnve Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163 (Conn. 1928).
33 Id. at 163-64.
23
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person or
property caused by such motor vehicle while so rented or
234
leased.
The plaintiff filed suit in Connecticut, wich used Beale's approach.
Under a strict application of Beale's method, the place of the injury was
Massachusetts, and the rule for torts is that the law of the place of mjury
governs. Consequently, since Massachusetts law governed and there was
no right to recover against an automobile lessor in Massachusetts, the
court should have found for the defendant.
The court avoided this result by characterizing the issue as one of
contract rather than tort. Because the issue was a contract issue,
Connecticut law - the place of the making of the contract - governed.
The leasing contract was made in Connecticut, and according to the court,
the Connecticut statute became part of the contract.23 5 Under this
interpretation, the plaintiff could recover from the lessor.
Professor Leflar in his discussion of this case is undoubtedly right
that the court used characterization to avoid what it believed was an
unfair result.236 The court thought that it would be unfair to allow the
plaintiff to go uncompensated, so it recharactenzed the issue as contract
in order for the Connecticut statute to control. However, as has been
mentioned several times above, this author believes that courts should not
use choice of law to provide substantive fairness. If Massachusetts law is
unfair, the Massachusetts legislature or courts should change it. A
Connecticut court should not be able to change it by mampulating choice
of law
While this author's approach is substantively neutral, it does not
always provide an unassailable result in all instances. In tlus case, persons
using this author's method might differ on what law should apply
Connecticut creates a statutory right that a party who is injured by an
automobile lessee's negligence can recover from a Connecticut lessor,
even if the lessor is not at fault. On the other hand, there is no right
against an automobile lessor for a lessee's negligence under Massachusetts law Tis is not a false conflicts case. The fact that there is no right
to recover against a lessor under Massachusetts law is a legally protected
interest.
Since there is a true conflict, the analyst must determine which state
has the closest connection to the facts. The car's driver and the defen-

Id. at 163 (quoting 1925 Conn. Pub. Acts 195 § 21).
Id. at 164. Of course, the contract was between the defendant lessor and
the lessee, not between the plaintiff and defendant. Id.
236 LEFLAR, supra note 16, at 176-80.
234
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dant/lessor were from Connecticut. The contract was entered into there
and partially performed there. However, the accident occurred in
Massachusetts, and the plaintiff apparently was from Massachusetts.
Looking at the parties' expectations produces contrary results. The
plaintiff (assuming he knew Massachusetts law) would not have expected
that he could recover from an automobile lessor for the lessee's negligence. On the other hand, a Connecticut automobile rental agency would
have expected to be liable for its lessee's negligence because of the
Connecticut statute.
Tus author is tempted to apply Connecticut law on policy grounds.
The rental company could have bought insurance to cover the cost of its
lessee's negligence, or it could have charged higher rates to compensate
for the possibility of a renter's accident. On the other hand, it is difficult
for a tortfeasor to be able to predict when she will be injured by an
uninsured party Still, this author rejects this reasoning because such
analysis is for substantive law, not choice of law In addition, for every
policy there is usually an opposite policy One might argue that allowing
the plaintiff to recover would discourage persons from buying uninsured
motorists insurance.
While this author believes that the choice of law in Levy could go
either way under this author's method, this author would adopt Massachusetts law The place of the accident and the plaintiff's residence were
there, and these seem to be the most significant connections to the facts.
In addition, the plaintiff has no relevant connection to Connecticut.
However, this author would not argue with someone who reached the
opposite conclusion. No choice of law method can fairly give a single
answer in all cases.
VI. THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED
METHOD OF CHOICE OF LAW

A final problem with choice of law in the United States is that each
state has its own choice of law rules. Some states employ Beale's
method, others the Second Restatement approach, others governmental
interest analysis, others different approaches, with each system producing
a different result in many cases. This individuality of approaches to
choice of law produces indeterminacy and invites forum shopping.
One of the reasons for this multitude of choice of law systems is that
there is no "superlaw" that prevents states from favoring their laws or
approaches, except for the very loose requirements in Allstate.237
17

See supra Part HI.A (notes 107-20 and accompanying text).
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Several scholars have stated that the constitution could provide greater
restraints on choice of law 23 For example, Professor Shreve points out
that: "The Due Process Clause could protect litigants' reasonable
expectations in choice of law. The Full Faith and Credit Clause could
prevent unwarranted refusals to apply sister-state law
[T]he
Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, and Commerce Clause could
secure nonresident litigants from discriminatory applications of forum
state law."2"' While this author agrees that the Supreme Court could use
these clauses to create greater uniformity in choice of law, the Court is
unlikely to do so m the immediate future.24
Several scholars have suggested that Congress could enact a uniform
choice of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution.24 The second sentence of this clause reads, "And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
24 2 In
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
other words, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Congress can
legislate the effect of one state's laws in another state; it can draft
national choice of law rules.
Some might view the above as infringing on the states' domain,
despite the fact that Congress has the power to do so under the Constitution. Nevertheless, tins author believes that a uniform approach to choice
of law is necessary, and that the best way to achieve such uniformity is
through an act of Congress. Of course, the states might adopt a uniform
law as they have done in other instances, such as with the Uniform
Commercial Code.243 However, this author believes that it is unlikely
that the states will be able to agree on a single method. 2"
E.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens ofEqual and TerritonalStates:
The ConstitutionalFoundation of Choice of Law, 92 CoLuM. L. REv 249
(1992); Shreve, supra note 131.
239 Shreve, supra note 131, at 274-75.
240 See also id. at 294-95.
241 CURRm, supranote 59, 125-26; WalterW Cook, ThePowers ofCongress
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421 (1919).
242 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
243 See Larry Kramer, On the Needfor a Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L.
REv 2134 (1991).
244 As statedsupraPart II.F (notes 93-106 and accompanyingtext), Professor
Kramer believes that the states would be better off if they cooperated in choice
of law. See also BRILMAYER, supra note 3, at 169-218. This author fully agrees
with Professor Kramer. However, tis author also sees the difficulty in fifty-one
jurisdictions deciding on a single choice of law system.
238
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CONCLUSION

In this Article, this author theorizes that many of the problems m
modem conflicts were caused by a switch from a multilateralist approach
to choice of law to a unilateralist one. This author also proposes a
multilateralist method of choice of law to remedy these problems. This
author's system consists of two steps. First, a court should determine the
legal relations created by the laws of the states that might apply to the
situation. If only one state provides legal relations that govern the
controversy, then there is no conflict of laws. Second, when a true
conflict exists, a court should employ the legal relation of the state that
has the closest connection to the facts.
The above method meets this author's criteria for a choice of law
system. First, the method is grounded in positive law Second, it is
substantively and forum neutral. Third, it is more predictable than other
approaches. Finally, it considers the interests of the relevant states and the
individual litigants.
This author also advocates that all states use a uniform method for
choosing law, because the myriad of systems the fifty states presently use
contributes to the indeterminacy of law. Such a umform method could be
created by an act of Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
tie United States Constitution or by a uniform law among the states.

